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Abstract
We study the long-term impact of climate change on economic activity across coun-
tries, using a stochastic growth model where labour productivity is a¤ected by country-
specic climate variables dened as deviations of temperature and precipitation from
their historical norms. Using a panel data set of 174 countries over the years 1960
to 2014, we nd that per-capita real output growth is adversely a¤ected by persistent
changes in the temperature above or below its historical norm, but we do not obtain
any statistically signicant e¤ects for changes in precipitation. Our counterfactual
analysis suggests that a persistent increase in average global temperature by 0.04C
per year, in the absence of mitigation policies, reduces world real GDP per capita by
7.22 percent by 2100. On the other hand, abiding by the Paris Agreement, thereby
limiting the temperature increase to 0.01C per annum, reduces the loss substantially
to 1.07 percent. These e¤ects vary signicantly across countries. We also provide
supplementary evidence using data on a sample of 48 U.S. states between 1963 and
2016, and show that climate change has a long-lasting adverse impact on real output
in various states and economic sectors, and on labour productivity and employment.
JEL Classications: C33, O40, O44, O51, Q51, Q54.
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1 Introduction
Global temperatures have increased signicantly in the past half century and extreme weather
events, such as cold and heat waves, droughts and oods, as well as natural disasters, are be-
coming more frequent and severe. These changes in the distribution of weather patterns (i.e.,
climate change) are not only a¤ecting low-income countries, but also advanced economies
in September 2017 while Los Angeles experienced the largest re in its history, Hurricanes
Harvey and Irma caused major destruction in Texas and Florida, respectively. A persistent
rise in temperature, changes in precipitation patterns and/or more volatile weather events
can have long-term macroeconomic e¤ects by adversely a¤ecting labour productivity, slow-
ing investment and damaging human health; something that is usually overlooked in the
literature owing to the focus of existing studies on short-term growth e¤ects.
This paper investigates the long-term macroeconomic e¤ects of climate change across 174
countries over the period 1960 to 2014. Climate change could a¤ect the level of output (by
changing agricultural yields, for example) or an economys ability to grow in the long-term
if the changes in climate variables are persistent, through reduced investment and lower
labour productivity. We focus on the latter and develop a theoretical growth model that
links deviations of climate variables (temperature and precipitation) from their historical
norms to changes in labour productivity and, hence real output per capita. In our empirical
application, we allow for dynamics and feedback e¤ects in the interconnections of climate
change and macroeconomic variables. Also, by using deviations of climate variables from
their respective historical norms, while allowing for nonlinearity, we avoid the econometric
pitfalls associated with the use of trended variables, such as temperature, in output growth
equations. As it is well known, and is also documented in our paper, temperature has been
trending upward strongly in almost all countries in the world, and its use as a regressor in a
growth regression can lead to spurious estimates.
To measure the damage caused by climate change, economists have sought to quantify
how aggregate economic growth is being a¤ected by rising temperatures and changes in
rainfall patterns; see a recent survey by Dell et al. (2014). Macroeconomic-climate estimates
are a key input in the design of optimal Pigouvian taxes or carbon pricing. These taxes
should reect the social cost of carbon (SCC), which represents the damage caused by the
release of one ton of carbon dioxide (Nordhaus 2017). To calculate the SCC, one must obtain
estimates of three distinct relationships. First, environmental scientists must measure the
relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and ambient carbon dioxide concentrations
(Pacala and Socolow 2004). Second, atmospheric scientists need to estimate the relationship
between ambient carbon dioxide concentrations and temperature (this is the so called climate
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sensitivity parameter, see Weitzman 2009).1 Third, economists should estimate the causal
e¤ects of rising average temperature on measures of economic activity.
The literature which attempts to quantify the e¤ects of climate change (temperature, pre-
cipitation, storms, and other aspects of the weather) on economic performance (agricultural
production, labour productivity, commodity prices, health, conict, and economic growth)
is relatively recent and mainly concerned with short-run e¤ects see Stern (2007), IPCC
(2013), Hsiang (2016), Cashin et al. (2017) and the recent surveys by Tol (2009) and Dell
et al. (2014). Moreover, there are a number of grounds on which the econometric evidence
of the e¤ects of climate change on growth may be questioned. Firstly, the literature relies
primarily on the cross-sectional approach (see, for instance, Sachs and Warner 1997, Gallup
et al. 1999, Nordhaus 2006, and Dell et al. 2009), and as such does not take into account
the time dimension of the data (i.e., assumes that the observed relationship across countries
holds over time as well) and is also subject to the endogeneity (reverse causality) problem
given the possible feedback e¤ects from changes in output growth onto the climate variable.
Secondly, the xed e¤ects (FE) estimators used in more recent panel-data studies im-
plicitly assume that climate variables are strictly exogenous, and thus rule out any reverse
causality from economic growth to rising average temperatures see Burke et al. (2015),
Dell et al. (2012), Dell et al. (2014), and Hsiang (2016), and the references therein. At the
heart of the Nordhaus DICE model is the need to account for this fundamental issue (see, for
instance, Nordhaus 1992). In his computable general equilibrium work, Nordhaus accounts
for the fact that faster economic activity increases the stock of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and thereby the average temperature. At the same time, rising average temperature
could reduce real economic activity. This equilibrium approach has important implications
for the econometric specication of climate changeeconomic growth relationship.
In fact, recent studies on climate science provide strong evidence that the main cause of
contemporary global warming is the release of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere by human
activities (Mitchell et al. 2001 and Brown et al. 2016). Consequently, when estimating the
impact of climate change on economic growth, temperature (Tit) may not be considered
as strictly exogenous, but merely weakly exogenous/predetermined to income growth; in
other words economic growth in the past might have feedback e¤ects on future temperature.
While it is well known that the FE estimator su¤ers from small-T bias in dynamic panels (see
Nickell 1981) with N (the cross-section dimension) larger than T (the time series dimension),
Chudik et al. 2018 show that this bias exists regardless of whether the lags of the dependent
variable are included or not, so long as one or more regressor is not strictly exogenous. In
1In recent work, Phillips et al. (2017) nd that the climate sensitivity parameter with respect to ambient
GHG concentrations is even larger than has previously been recognised.
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such cases, inference based on the standard FE estimator will be invalid and can result in
large size distortions unless N=T ! 0, as N; T ! 1 jointly. Therefore, caution must be
exercised when interpreting the results from studies that use the standard FE estimators in
the climate changeeconomic growth literature given that N is often larger than T .
Thirdly, econometric specications of the climate changemacroeconomic relation are
often written in terms of real GDP per capita growth and the level of temperature, Tit, and
in some cases also T 2it ; see, for instance, Dell et al. (2012) and Burke et al. (2015). But if Tit
is trended, which is the case in almost all countries in the world (see Section 3.1), inclusion
of Tit in the regression will induce a quadratic trend in equilibrium log per capita output (or
equivalently a linear trend in per capita output growth) which is not desirable and can bias
the estimates of the growthclimate change equation. Finally, another major drawback of
this literature is that the econometric specications of the climate changegrowth relation
are generally not derived from or based on a theoretical growth model. Either an ad hoc
approach is used, where real income growth is regressed on a number of arbitrarilychosen
variables, or a theoretical model is developed but not put to a rigorous empirical test.
We contribute to the climate changeeconomic growth literature along the following di-
mensions. Firstly, we extend the stochastic single-country growth models of Merton (1975),
Brock and Mirman (1972), and Binder and Pesaran (1999) to N countries sharing a common
technology but di¤erent climate conditions. Our theoretical model postulates that labour
productivity in each country is a¤ected by a common technological factor and country-
specic climate variables, which we take to be average temperature, Tit, and precipitation,
Pit, in addition to other country-specic idiosyncratic shocks. As long as Tit and Pit remain
close to their respective historical norms (regarded as technologically neutral), they are not
expected to a¤ect labour productivity. However, if climate variables deviate from their his-
torical norms, the e¤ects on labour productivity could be positive or negative, depending on
the region under consideration. For example, in a historically cold region, a rise in temper-
ature above its historical norm might result in higher labour productivity, whilst for a dry
region, a fall in precipitation below its historical norms is likely to have adverse e¤ects on
labour productivity.2 Secondly, contrary to much of the literature which is mainly concerned
with short-term growth e¤ects, we explicitly model and test the long-run growth e¤ects of
persistent increases in temperature. Thirdly, we use the half-panel Jackknife FE (HPJ-FE)
estimator proposed in Chudik et al. (2018) to deal with the possible bias and size distortion
of the commonly-used FE estimator (given that Tit is weakly exogenous). When the time
2Our focus on the deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical norms also marks a
departure from the literature, as changes in the distribution of weather patterns (not only averages of climate
variables but also their variability) are modeled explicitly.
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dimension of the panel is moderate relative to N , the HPJ-FE estimator e¤ectively corrects
the Nickel-type bias if regressors are weakly exogenous, and is robust to possible feedback
e¤ects from aggregate economic activity to the climate variables.
We start by documenting that the global average temperature has risen by 0:0181 de-
grees Celsius per year over the last half century (19602014), with positive country-specic
trend estimates in 169 out of 174 countries in our sample (97.1% of cases), and statistically
signicant estimates at the 5% level in 161 out of 169 countries with positive trends (95.3%
of cases). For the remaining ve countries, while the trend estimates are negative, they
are not statistically signicant at the 5% level. Overall, as discussed above, the fact that
temperature is trended in almost all countries poses a problem for those studies that include
Tit in their growth regressions as it can bias the estimates, not to mention that it imposes a
trend in per capita GDP growth which is something we do not observe.
We test the predictions of our theoretical model using cross-country data on per-capita
output growth and the deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical
norms over the past fty ve years (19602014). Our results suggest that a persistent change
in the climate has a long-term negative e¤ect on per capita GDP growth. Specically, we
show that if temperature rises (falls) above (below) its historical norm by 0:01C annually,
income growth will be lower by 0:0543 percentage points per year. We could not detect any
signicant evidence of an asymmetric long-term growth impact from positive and negative
deviations of temperature from its norms. Furthermore, we show that our empirical ndings
apply equally to poor or rich, and hot or cold countries. This is contrary to most of the
literature which nds that temperature increases have uneven macroeconomic e¤ects, with
adverse consequences in countries with hot climates, such as low-income countries; see, for
instance, Sachs and Warner (1997), Jones and Olken (2010), Dell et al. (2012), International
Monetary Fund (2017), and Mejia et al. (2018).
To contribute to climate policy discussions, we perform a number of counterfactual exer-
cises where we investigate the cumulative income e¤ects of annual increases in temperatures
over the period 20152100 (when compared to a baseline scenario under which tempera-
ture in each country increases according to its historical trend of 19602014). We show that
an increase in average global temperature of 0:04C per year corresponding to the Repre-
sentative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 scenario (see Figure 1), which assumes higher
greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of mitigation policies reduces worlds real GDP
per capita by 7:22 percent by 2100. Limiting the increase to 0.01C per annum, which corre-
sponds to the December 2015 Paris Agreement, reduces the output loss substantially to 1:07
percent, only. Thus our analysis nds strong support for keeping with the Paris Agreement
4
Figure 1: Global Temperature Projections (Deviations from 1984-2014)
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase
Five AR5 Atlas Subset.
Notes: The thin lines represent each of the 40 models in the IPCC WG1 AR5 Annex I Atlas. The thick lines
represent the multimodel mean. Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) are scenarios of greenhouse
gas concentrations, constructed by the IPCC. RCP 2.6 corresponds to the Paris Agreement which aims to
hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
RCP 8.5 is an unmitigated scenario in which emissions continue to rise throughout the 21st century.
pledges to avoid substantial output losses.3
To put our results into perspective, the conclusions one might draw from most of the
existing climate changemacroeconomy literature are the following: (i) when a poor (hot)
country is 1C warmer than usual, its income growth falls by 12 percentage points in the
short- to medium-term; (ii) when a rich (temperate) country is 1C warmer than usual,
there is little impact on its economic activity; and (iii) the GDP e¤ect of increases in average
temperatures (with or without adaptation and/or mitigation policies) is relatively small a
few percent decline in the level of GDP per capita over the next century (see, Figure 2).
In contrast, our counterfactual estimates suggest that all regions (cold or hot, and rich or
poor) would experience a relatively large fall in GDP per capita by 2100 in the absence of
climate change policies (i.e., the RCP 8.5 scenario). However, the size of these income e¤ects
varies across countries depending on the projected paths of temperatures (see Figures 6 and
7); for instance, for the U.S. the losses are relatively large at 10.52 percent under the RCP
8.5 scenario in year 2100 (reecting a sharp increase in average temperatures), but would
3The Paris Agreement, reached within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), aims to keep the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels over the 21st century. It is worth noting that average global temperature is already 1C
above the pre-industrial levels.
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Figure 2: GDP Impact of Increases in Temperature
Sources: Tol (2009), Tol (2014), Burke et al. (2015), International Monetary Fund (2017) and authors
estimates (shown as the grey area in the chart).
Notes: Projected GDP impact is for some future year, typically 2100. The shaded area represents the GDP
per capita losses from our counterfactual exercise in Section 4 with the upper bound based on m = 20 and
the lower bound based on m = 40.
be limited to 1.88 percent under the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the speed with which the
historical norms change (20-, 30-, or 40-year moving averages), that is how fast countries
adapt to global warming or new climate conditions, a¤ects the size of income losses. Overall,
while climate change adaptation could reduce these negative long-run growth e¤ects, it is
highly unlikely to o¤set them entirely.
Finally, having established a long-run negative relationship between economic growth
and climate change across countries (regardless of their level of development), we examine
the climate changegrowth relationship in a within-country context (which is scant in the
literature) and also focus on the channels of impact (labour productivity, employment, and
output growth in various sectors of the economy). While cross-country studies are infor-
mative, they also have drawbacks. Averaging temperature and precipitation data at the
country level leads to a loss of information, especially in geographically diverse countries
such as Brazil, China, India, Russia and the United States. In particular, while the na-
tional average of climate variables may be close to their historical norms, there is signicant
heterogeneity within countries. The within-country geographic heterogeneity of the United
States enables us to compare whether economic activity in hotor wetstates responds to a
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temperature increase in the same way as economic activity does in coldor drystates. The
richness of the United States data also allows for a more disaggregated study of the climate
changegrowth relationship and enables us to test whether the country at the aggregate
level, parts of the country, or particular sectors of the economy have been more successful in
their adaptation/mitigation e¤orts. To do so, we conduct a case study of the United States
using data on 48 states over the period 1963 to 2016, the HPJ-FE estimator, and various
state-specic economic performance indicators at the aggregate and sectoral levels.
Our within-country results provide evidence for the damage that climate change causes
in the U.S. using various economic indicators at the state level: growth rates of Gross State
Product (GSP), GSP per capita, labour productivity, and employment as well as output in
di¤erent sectors (e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, services, retail and wholesale trade). We
show that if temperature increases by 0:01C annually above its historical norm across U.S.
states, average per-capita real GSP growth will be lower by 0:0273 percentage points per
year a number that is smaller than those obtained in our cross-country regressions. We also
show that the impact of climate change on sectoral output growth is broad based each of
the 10 sectors considered is a¤ected by at least one of the four climate variables. Moreover,
in contrast to our cross-country results, the within U.S. estimates tend to be asymmetrical
with respect to deviations of climate variables from their historical norms (in the positive
and negative directions). Finally, our results highlight the importance of climate change
policies. While we acknowledge some resilience-building e¤orts in advanced economies, the
evidence from the U.S. study (as well as the cross-country analysis) seems to suggest that it
has not entirely o¤set the negative e¤ects of climate change at the macro level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a multi-country
stochastic growth model with climate e¤ects. Section 3 considers the extent to which tem-
perature has been rising across countries and globally, and discusses the long-run e¤ects of
climate change on output growth across countries. Section 4 conducts counterfactual exer-
cises to investigate the cumulative income e¤ects of annual increases in temperatures under
an unmitigated path as well as the Paris Agreement up to the year 2100. Section 5 uses
a range of economic performance indicators across U.S. states and production sectors to
examine the consequences of climate change for a typical advanced economy and the role of
adaptation. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
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2 AMulti-Country Stochastic GrowthModel with Cli-
mate E¤ects
Theoretical growth models generally focus on technological progress and permanent improve-
ments in the e¢ ciency with which factors of production are combined as the main drivers
of long-term economic growth, and ignore the possible e¤ects of climate change. Examples
include Merton (1975), Brock and Mirman (1972), Donaldson and Mehra (1983), Marimon
(1989), and Binder and Pesaran (1999), who have developed stochastic growth models for
single economies. We extend this literature and consider the growth process across N coun-
tries sharing a common technology but subject to di¤erent climate conditions.
Consider a set of economies in which aggregate production possibilities are described by
the following production function:
Yit = F (itLit; Kit) ;
where Lit, and Kit, are labour and capital inputs, and it is a scale variable that determines
labour productivity in economy i. We suppose that labour productivity is governed by
a common technological factor, t > 0, as well as country-specic climate variables. We
consider average temperature (Tit) and precipitation (Pit) as the main climate variables, but
assume labour productivity is a¤ected by climate variables only when they deviate from their
historical norms, which we denote by T i;t 1 and Pi;t 1, respectively.
The historical norms are regarded as technologically neutral, in the sense that if climate
variables remain close to their historical norms, they are not expected to have any e¤ects
on labour productivity. Recent research demonstrates that di¤erent regions of the U.S. have
acclimated themselves to their own temperature niche. Heutel et al. (2016) document that
heat waves cause more deaths in U.S. regions that are accustomed to colder norms than
it does in hotter places. Moreover, if climate variables deviate from their historical norms,
the e¤ects on labour productivity could be positive or negative, depending on the region
under consideration. For example, in a historically cold region, a rise in temperature above
its historical norm might result in higher labour productivity, whilst for a dry region, a
fall in precipitation below its historical norms is likely to have adverse e¤ects on labour
productivity. Accordingly, in what follows we also allow for an asymmetry in the e¤ects
of deviations from the historical norms on labour productivity, and introduce the following
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climate threshold variables:
 Tit   T i;t 1+ =  Tit   T i;t 1 I  Tit   T i;t 1  0 , (1) Tit   T i;t 1  =    Tit   T i;t 1 I  Tit   T i;t 1 < 0 ;
and
 Pit   Pi;t 1+ =  Pit   Pi;t 1 I  Pit   Pi;t 1  0 ; (2) Pit   Pi;t 1  =    Pit   Pi;t 1 I  Pit   Pi;t 1 < 0 :
By distinguishing between positive and negative deviations of the climate variables from
their historical norms we also take account of potential nonlinear e¤ects of climate change
on economic growth.
Specically, we consider the following specication for changes in labour productivity in
terms of the climate variables:4
it = Ai
i
t exp
h
 +0i
 Cit   Ci;t 1+    0i  Cit   Ci;t 1 i ; (3)
where Ai and i are positive constants, Cit = (Tit;Pit)0, Ci;t 1 =
 T i;t 1;Pi;t 10, +i =
(+iT ; 
+
iP)
0, and  i = (
 
iT ; 
 
iP)
0.
The historical norms can vary over time, but such variations are likely to be small in the
short- to medium-term. One could also consider modelling the adverse e¤ects of deviating
from climatic norms, by using the quadratic formulation, for example,
 Tit   T i;t 12 instead
of the threshold e¤ects
 Tit   T i;t 1+ and  Tit   T i;t 1 . But in cases where Tit is trended,
which is the situation in almost all the 174 countries in our sample (see Table 1 and the
discussion in Section 3.1), the inclusion of i
 Tit   T i;t 12 will induce a quadratic trend in
equilibrium log per capita output (or equivalently a linear trend in per capita output growth)
which is not desirable and can bias the estimates of the growth-climate change equation. Our
focus on the deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical norms marks
a departure from the existing literature by implicitly modelling climate variability around
long-term trends. To simplify the notation in what follows, we write it in (3) as
it = Ai
i
t exp (  0ixit) ; (4)
4Additional country-specic technology shocks can also be included, but to simplify the theoretical expo-
sition we abstract from such shocks and note that part of the shock to Lit dened below by uit (see equation
(7)) could be viewed as technological in nature.
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where
xit =
"  Cit   Ci;t 1+ Cit   Ci;t 1 
#
; and i =
 
+i
 i
!
:
Assuming constant returns to scale, we have
Yit = itLit f (it) ; (5)
where it denotes the ratio of physical capital to e¤ective units of labour input, that is
it =
Kit
itLit
: (6)
Further, we assume that labour input, Lit, evolves according to the following process
log(Lit) = li0 + ni t+ uit; (7)
where li0 is an economy-specic initial endowment of labour input, ni is the exogenously-
determined rate of growth of labour input, and uit is the stochastic component which could
be driven by a combination of demand and supply shocks. Given our emphasis on the long-
run e¤ects of climate change on income growth, we do not attempt to identify such shocks,
and assume that uit follows an AR(1) process
4 uit =   (1  i)ui;t 1 + "it; jij  1; "it  iid (0; 2i ): (8)
Shocks to labour input could be correlated with the predictable part of weather conditions.
For example, during heat waves, labour supply could fall before recovering in normal times,
something that is reected in work patterns of "Siesta economies". In such a setting, seasonal
or cyclical changes in weather conditions might not have long-run growth e¤ects, but can
nevertheless lead to negative short-run correlations between labour input and weather shocks
(as workers adapt their schedules to the changing weather conditions). It is, therefore, im-
portant to distinguish between short-run e¤ects and the long-term impact of climate change
on income growth. The short-run correlation between weather and labour input shocks also
renders the weather variable weakly exogenous, with important econometric implications for
estimation of long-run growth e¤ects of permanent shifts in climate conditions.
The physical capital stock depreciates in each period at a constant rate i, and obeys the
linear law of motion
Ki;t+1 = (1  i)Kit + Iit; i 2 (0; 1): (9)
The assumption of a constant rate of capital depreciation is made for analytical convenience,
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and can be relaxed. In practice, the rate of capital depreciation is likely to vary over time
rising signicantly at times of armed conicts and natural disasters such as earthquakes,
tsunamis and hurricanes, and gradual reversals afterwards with reconstruction activities
and new capital investments. Once again, this highlights the importance of distinguishing
between short-term and long-term e¤ects. One would expect the contemporaneous negative
e¤ects of natural disasters to be somewhat reversed in subsequent periods.
The model specication is completed by assuming that householdsaggregate saving is
given by
Sit = s (it)Yit; (10)
where the saving function, s () ; is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable and sit 2 (0; 1).
In equilibrium, we have
Sit = Iit = s (it)Yit; (11)
hence
Ki;t+1 = (1  i)Kit + s (it)Yit: (12)
Following the literature, we assume that that f () is twice continuously di¤erentiable, is
strictly increasing and concave, and satises f(0) = 0, as well as the Inada conditions
lim!0 f
0
() = +1, and lim!1 f 0 () = 0, for any given value of it = .
The capital accumulation process, (12), can then be written as
Ki;t+1
i;t+1Li;t+1
i;t+1Li;t+1
itLit
= (1  i) Kit
itLit
+ s (it)
Yit
itLit
;
which upon using (5) and (6) yields
i;t+1 exp [ ln (i;t+1Li;t+1)] = (1  i)it + s (it) f (it) :
Also,
 ln (i;t+1Li;t+1) = ni + it+1    0ixi;t+1 +4ui;t+1:
In what follows, we assume that
xi;t+1 = wi + it+ vi;t+1;
t+1 =    (1  ) t + v;t+1; (13)
where vi;t+1 and v;t+1 are climate and technology "shocks" that are assumed to be serially
uncorrelated. The above processes allow for linear trends in the climate variables and unit
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roots in the technology. The steady state value of it depends on the distribution of the
combined shock
i;t+1 = iv;t+1 + 
0
ivi;t+1 +4ui;t+1:
If we assume that all moments of i;t+1 exist, and extend the analysis of Binder and Pesaran
(1999) to N countries by allowing for a common technology factor and climate e¤ects, it is
possible to show that flntg and ftg are bounded by rst-order stationary processes with
nite moments, and hence they converge to random variables that have moments.
Suppose the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, then using (4), (5) and (13), we
have
yit = ln (Yit=Lit) = ln(Ai) + it + 
0
ixit + i ln (it) ;
where i is the exponent of the capital input in economy is production function. Using the
result that ln (it) is bounded by a stationary AR(1) process, and noting that xit and t are
exogenously determined, then variations in the steady state values of yit are determined by
changes in technology and climate variables. The model can generate a unit root in yit by
setting  = 1 in (13). In this case the growth rate of per capita output can be written as
4yit = i    0i4 xit + i4 ln (it) + vt;
where owing to the mean stationarity of ln (it), we have E [4 ln (it)] = 0, and hence
E (4yit) = i    0iE (4xit) : (14)
Therefore, in equilibrium the mean per capita output growth is positively a¤ected by tech-
nological progress, i > 0, and negatively impacted by deviation of the climate variables
from their historical norms when i > 0. This specication has the added advantage that
E (4yit) does not inherit the strong trend in Tit, which the country/global temperatures
have been subject to over the past 55 years (see Section 3.1 and Table 1).
In a panel data context, ln (it) can be approximated by a linear stationary process
with possibly common factors, which yields the following Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag
(ARDL) specication for yit
'i(L)yit = ai + bi(L)
0
i4 xit + "it; (15)
where i = 1; 2; :::; N ; t = 1; 2; :::; T; 'i(L) and bi(L) are nite order distributed lag functions,
ai (related to i) is the xed e¤ect, and "it is a serially uncorrelated shock.
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3 Empirical Results
In the empirical application, we use annual population-weighted climate data and real GDP
per capita. For the climate variables we consider temperature (measured in degrees Celsius,
C) and precipitation (measured in meters). We construct population-weighted climate
data for each country and year between 1900 and 2014 using the terrestrial air temperature
and precipitation observations from Matsuura and Willmott (2015) (containing 0.5 degree
gridded monthly time series), and the gridded population of the world collection from CIESIN
(2016), for which we use the population density in 2010. We obtain the real GDP per
capita data between 1960 and 2014 from the World Development Indicators database of
the World Bank. Combining the GDP per capita and the climate data, we end up with an
unbalanced panel, which is very rich both in terms of the time dimension (T ), with maximum
T = 55 and average T  39, and the cross-sectional dimension (N), containing 174 countries.
Before investigating the long-run e¤ects of climate change on economic growth, we begin by
providing some evidence on how the climate is changing.
3.1 Climate Change: Historical Patterns
This section examines how global temperature has evolved over the past half century (1960
2014). Allowing for the signicant heterogeneity that exists across countries with respect to
changes in temperature over time, we estimate country-specic regressions
Tit = aT i + bT it+ vT i;t; for i = 1; 2; :::; N = 174; (16)
where Tit denotes the population-weighted average temperature of country i at year t. The
per annum average increase in land temperature for country i is given by bT i; with the
corresponding global measure dened by bT = N 1Ni=1bT i. Individual country estimates
of bT i together with their standard errors are summarised in Table 1. As can be seen, the
estimates range from  0:0044 (Samoa) to 0:0390 (Afghanistan). For 169 countries (97.1%
of cases), these estimates are positive; out of which, the estimates in 161 countries (95.3% of
cases) are statistically signicant at the 5% level. There are only ve countries for which the
estimate, bbT i, is not positive: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Samoa, but none of
these estimates are statistically signicant at the 5% level. See also Figure 4 which illustrates
the increase in temperature per year for the 174 countries over 19602014.
Appendix A presents estimates of bT i over a longer time horizon (19002014). The
country-specic estimates of bT i for the 174 countries over this longer sample period range
from 0:0008 (Greece) to 0:0190 (Haiti). In 172 countries (98.9% of the cases) these estimates
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Table 1: Individual Country Estimates of the Average Yearly Rise in Tempera-
ture Over the Period 19602014
Country bbT i Country bbT i Country bbT i
Afghanistan 0.0390*** Georgia 0.0159*** Oman 0.0082***
Albania 0.0240*** Germany 0.0229*** Pakistan 0.0096***
Algeria 0.0288*** Ghana 0.0184*** Panama 0.0169***
Angola 0.0193*** Greece 0.0112*** Papua New Guinea 0.0074***
Argentina 0.0070*** Greenland 0.0381*** Paraguay 0.0047
Armenia 0.0140** Guatemala 0.0276*** Peru 0.0065**
Australia 0.0094*** Guinea 0.0166*** Philippines 0.0068***
Austria 0.0170*** Guinea-Bissau 0.0237*** Poland 0.0255***
Azerbaijan 0.0188*** Guyana 0.0029 Portugal 0.0104***
Bahamas 0.0195*** Haiti 0.0163*** Puerto Rico 0.0059**
Bangladesh -0.0007 Honduras 0.0207*** Qatar 0.0271***
Belarus 0.0316*** Hungary 0.0163*** Romania 0.0186***
Belgium 0.0261*** Iceland 0.0206*** Russian Federation 0.0348***
Belize 0.0114*** India 0.0095*** Rwanda 0.0158***
Benin 0.0180*** Indonesia 0.0053*** Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0124***
Bhutan 0.0143*** Iran 0.0229*** Samoa -0.0044*
Bolivia -0.0000 Iraq 0.0244*** Sao Tome and Principe 0.0240***
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0373*** Ireland 0.0151*** Saudi Arabia 0.0207***
Botswana 0.0260*** Israel 0.0168*** Senegal 0.0255***
Brazil 0.0162*** Italy 0.0283*** Serbia 0.0155***
Brunei Darussalam 0.0096*** Jamaica 0.0204*** Sierra Leone 0.0161***
Bulgaria 0.0124*** Japan 0.0133*** Slovakia 0.0197***
Burkina Faso 0.0191*** Jordan 0.0146*** Slovenia 0.0298***
Burundi 0.0186*** Kazakhstan 0.0240*** Solomon Islands 0.0096***
Cabo Verde 0.0181*** Kenya 0.0176*** Somalia 0.0213***
Cambodia 0.0167*** Kuwait 0.0254*** South Africa 0.0073***
Cameroon 0.0117*** Kyrgyzstan 0.0280*** South Korea 0.0081*
Canada 0.0300*** Laos 0.0091*** South Sudan 0.0308***
Central African Republic 0.0099*** Latvia 0.0304*** Spain 0.0260***
Chad 0.0181*** Lebanon 0.0247*** Sri Lanka 0.0107***
Chile 0.0102*** Lesotho 0.0099** Sudan 0.0295***
China 0.0230*** Liberia 0.0094*** Suriname 0.0042
Colombia 0.0061** Libya 0.0333*** Swaziland 0.0174***
Comoros 0.0062* Lithuania 0.0277*** Sweden 0.0210***
Congo 0.0146*** Luxembourg 0.0281*** Switzerland 0.0183***
Congo DRC 0.0150*** Macedonia 0.0129*** Syria 0.0225***
Costa Rica 0.0173*** Madagascar 0.0214*** Tajikistan 0.0002
Côte dIvoire 0.0131*** Malawi 0.0234*** Tanzania 0.0104***
Croatia 0.0247*** Malaysia 0.0133*** Thailand 0.0055**
Cuba -0.0006 Mali 0.0214*** Togo 0.0185***
Cyprus 0.0151*** Mauritania 0.0243*** Trinidad and Tobago 0.0243***
Czech Republic 0.0192*** Mauritius 0.0216*** Tunisia 0.0368***
Denmark 0.0195*** Mexico 0.0117*** Turkey 0.0141**
Djibouti 0.0135*** Moldova 0.0202*** Turkmenistan 0.0255***
Dominican Republic 0.0152*** Mongolia 0.0276*** Uganda 0.0198***
Ecuador -0.0031 Montenegro 0.0196*** Ukraine 0.0263***
Egypt 0.0272*** Morocco 0.0211*** United Arab Emirates 0.0158***
El Salvador 0.0319*** Mozambique 0.0148*** United Kingdom 0.0129***
Equatorial Guinea 0.0275*** Myanmar 0.0200*** United States 0.0147***
Eritrea 0.0178*** Namibia 0.0262*** Uruguay 0.0151***
Estonia 0.0330*** Nepal 0.0176*** US Virgin Islands 0.0226***
Ethiopia 0.0219*** Netherlands 0.0240*** Uzbekistan 0.0214***
Fiji 0.0115*** New Caledonia 0.0118*** Vanuatu 0.0279***
Finland 0.0304*** New Zealand 0.0018 Venezuela 0.0160***
France 0.0215*** Nicaragua 0.0286*** Vietnam 0.0054**
French Polynesia 0.0236*** Niger 0.0075 Yemen 0.0345***
Gabon 0.0177*** Nigeria 0.0163*** Zambia 0.0190***
Gambia 0.0234*** Norway 0.0232*** Zimbabwe 0.0139***
Notes: bbT i is the OLS estimate of bT i in the country-specic regressions Tit = aT i + bT it+ vT ;it, where Tit
denotes the population-weighted average temperature (C). Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
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are positive and in 156 countries (90.7% of cases) they are statistically signicant at the 5%
level. There are only two countries for which the estimate of bT i is not positive: Greece and
Macedonia but these are not statistically signicant. The estimated results over 19002014
echo those obtained over the 19602014 period. Temperature has been rising for pretty much
all of the countries in our sample, indicating that Tit is trended. As discussed earlier, the
econometric specications in the literature involve real GDP growth rates and the level of
temperature, Tit, and in some cases also T 2it ; see, for instance, Dell et al. (2012) and Burke
et al. (2015). But in cases where Tit is trended, which is the situation in almost all the
countries in the world (based on both the 19002014 and the 19602014 samples), inclusion
of Tit in the regressions will induce a quadratic trend in equilibrium log per capita output
(or equivalently a linear trend in per capita output growth) which is not desirable and can
bias the estimates of the growth-climate change equation.
The above country-specic estimates are also in line with the average increases in global
temperature published by the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) at National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), and close to the estimates by the National Cen-
ters for Environmental Information (NCEI) at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA). The right panel in Figure 3 plots the global land temperatures between
1960 and 2014 recorded by NOAA and NASA; clearly showing that Tt is trended. IPCC
(2013) also estimates similar trends using various datasets and over di¤erent sub-periods. For
instance, the trend estimates of global land-surface air temperature (in C per decade) over
the 1951-2012 period, based on data from the Climatic Research Units CRUTEM4.1.1.0,
NOAAs Global Historical Climatology Network Version 3 (GHCNv3), and Berkeley Earth,
are reported as 0.175 (0:037), 0.197 (0:031), and 0.175 (0:029), respectively with 90%
condence intervals in brackets; see Chapter 2 of IPCC (2013) for details.
Using the individual country estimates in Table 1, the average rise in global temperature
over the 1960-2014 period is given by b^T = 0:0181(0:0007) degrees Celsius per annum, which
is statistically highly signicant.5 In comparison, according to NASA observations global
land temperature has risen by 0:89C between 1960 and 2014, or around 0:0165C per year,
and based on NCEI data the global land-surface air temperature has risen by 1:07C over
the same period, or around 0:0198C per year. Thus our global estimate of 0:0181C lies in
the middle of these two estimates, but has the added advantage of having a small standard
error, noting that it is a pooled estimate across a large number of countries.
We also plot the global land-surface air and sea-surface water temperatures in the left
panel of Figure 3. We observe an upward trend using data from NOAA (a rise of 0:72C)
5The standard error of b^T = N 1Ni=1b^T i, given in round brackets, is computed using the mean group
approach of Pesaran and Smith (1995).
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Figure 3: Global Land-Surface Air and Sea-Surface Water Temperatures (De-
grees Celsius, 1960 = 0)
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Note: The left panel shows the global land-surface air and sea-surface water temperatures, and the right
panel shows the global land-surface air temperatures, both over the 19602014 period. The blue lines show
the temperatures observed by the National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) at the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); and the broken red lines show the temperatures ob-
served by the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) at National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). The temperatures in 1960 are standardised to zero.
Figure 4: Temperature Increase per year for the 174 Countries, 19602014
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or data from NASA (a rise of 0:77C) between 1960 and 2014; equivalent to 0:0134C and
0:0143C per year, respectively. Note that the land-surface air temperature has risen by
more than the sea-surface water temperature over this period, because oceans have a larger
e¤ective heat capacity and lose more heat through evaporation.
3.2 Long-Term Impact of Climate Change on Economic Growth
Guided by the theoretical growth model with climate variables set out above in Section 2,
we examine the long-term impact of climate change on per capita output growth across
countries. To this end, we estimate the following panel ARDL model:
yit = ai +
pX
`=1
'`yi;t ` +
pX
`=0

0
`xi;t ` + "it; (17)
where yit is the log of real GDP per capita of country i in year t, ai is the country-specic
xed e¤ect, xit = [
 Cit   Ci;t 1+,  Cit   Ci;t 1 ]0, Cit = (Tit;Pit)0, Ci;t 1 =  T i;t 1;Pi;t 10,
Tit and Pit are the population-weighted average temperature and precipitation of country
i in year t, respectively, and T i;t 1 and Pi;t 1 are the historical norms of climate variables.
With Cit   Ci;t 1 separated into positive and negative values, we account for the potential
nonlinear e¤ects of climate change on economic growth. The (average) long-run e¤ects,
 , are calculated from the OLS estimates of the short-run coe¢ cients in equation (17):
 =  1
Pp
`=0 `, where  = 1 
Pp
`=1 '`.
For the historical norms, we consider the moving averages of temperature and precip-
itation of country i based on the past m years: T i;t 1 = m 1
Pm
s=1 Ti;t s and Pi;t 1 =
m 1
Pm
l=1Pi;t l, with m being a large enough number to make the variations of the histor-
ical norm in each year small. We select m = 30, given that climate norms are typically
computed using 30-year moving averages (see, for instance, Arguez et al. 2012 and Vose
et al. 2014), but to check the robustness of our results, we also consider historical norms
computed using moving averages with m = 20 and 40 in Section 3.3.
Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that:
the traditional ARDL approach can be used for long-run analysis; it is valid regardless of
whether the underlying variables are I (0) or I (1); and it is robust to omitted variables bias
and bi-directional feedback e¤ects between economic growth and its determinants. These
features of the panel ARDL approach are clearly appealing in our empirical application.
For validity of this technique, however, the dynamic specication of the model needs to be
augmented with a su¢ cient number of lagged e¤ects so that the regressors become weakly
exogenous. Specically, Chudik et al. (2016), show that su¢ ciently long lags are necessary
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for the consistency of the panel ARDL approach.6 Since the impact of climate change on
output growth could be long lasting, the lag order should be long enough, and as such we set
p = 4 for all the variables/countries. Using the same lag order across all the variables and
countries help reduce the possible adverse e¤ects of data mining that could accompany the
use of country and variable specic lag order selection procedures such as Akaike or Schwarz
criteria. Note also that our primary focus here is on the long-run estimates rather than the
specic dynamics that might be relevant for a particular country.
Table 2 presents the estimates for the four di¤erent specications of panel ARDL regres-
sions in (17). We report the xed e¤ects (FE) estimates of the long-run impact of changes
in the climate variables on GDP per capita growth (b), and the estimated coe¢ cients of the
error correction term (b) in columns (a). When the cross-sectional dimension of the panel
is larger than the time dimension (in our panel, N = 174 and the average T  38, see Table
2), the standard FE estimator su¤ers from small-T bias regardless of whether the lags of
the dependent variable are included or not, so long as one or more of the regressors are
not strictly exogenous (see Chudik et al. 2018). Since the lagged values of growth and the
climate variables can be correlated with the lagged values of the error term "it, the regressors
(climate variables) are weakly exogenous, and hence, inference based on the standard FE
estimator is invalid and can result in large size distortions. To deal with these issues, we
use the half-panel Jackknife FE (HPJ-FE) estimator of Chudik et al. (2018) and report the
results in columns (b) of Table 2. The jackknife bias correction requires N; T ! 1, but it
allows T to rise at a much slower rate than N , making it attractive in our application.
Specication 1 of Table 2 reports the baseline results. The FE and HPJ-FE estimated
coe¢ cients of the precipitation variables, b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
+ and b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
 , are not statisti-
cally signicant. However, long-run economic growth is adversely a¤ected when temperature
deviates from its historical norm persistently, as b
(Tit T i;t 1)
+ and b
(Tit T i;t 1)
  are both
statistically signicant. The HPJ-FE estimates suggest that a 0:01C annual increase in the
temperature above its historical norm reduces real GDP per capita growth by 0:0577 per-
centage points per year and a 0:01C annual decrease in the temperature below its historical
norm reduces real GDP per capita growth by 0:0505 percentage points per year. Note that
the FE estimates (which are widely used in the literature) are smaller than their HPJ-FE
counterparts in absolute values.7
Since the estimates of deviations of precipitation variables from their historical norms
(both above and below) are not statistically signicant in the baseline, we re-estimate equa-
6See also Chudik et al. (2013) and Chudik et al. (2017).
7Since the half-panel jackknife procedure splits the data set into two halves, for countries with an odd
number of time observations, we drop the rst observation. Thus, the number of observations in Columns
(a) and (b) are somewhat di¤erent.
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tion (17) without them; setting xit = [
 Tit   T i;t 1+ ;  Tit   T i;t 1 ]0 in specication 2. The
results show that persistent deviations of temperature above or below its historical norm, Tit   T i;t 1+ or  Tit   T i;t 1 , have negative e¤ects on long-run economic growth. Specif-
ically, the HPJ-FE estimates suggest that a persistent 0:01C increase in the temperature
above its historical norm reduces real GDP per capita growth by 0:0586 percentage points
per annum in the long run (being statistically signicant at the 1% level), and a 0:01C
annual decrease in the temperature below its historical norm reduces real GDP per capita
growth by 0:0520 percentage points per year (being statistically signicant at the 5% level).
Given that the estimates of the coe¢ cients of
 Tit   T i;t 1+ and  Tit   T i;t 1  are very
similar in magnitude suggests that positive and negative deviations of temperature from its
historical norm have similar e¤ects on long-term growth.
Most studies in the literature provide evidence for the uneven macroeconomic e¤ects of
climate change, with adverse short-term consequences in countries with hot climates, such as
low-income countries; see, for instance, Sachs and Warner (1997), Jones and Olken (2010),
and Dell et al. (2012). In other words, when a rich (temperate) country is warmer, there
is little impact on its economic activity. There are intuitive reasons and anecdotal evidence
for this, including adaptation that has taken place particularly in advanced economies; they
are more urbanised and much of the economic activity takes place indoors. For instance,
Singapore has attempted to insulate its economy from the heat by extensively engaging in
economic activity in places with air conditioning. Therefore, if individuals are aware of how
extreme heat a¤ects their economic performance, they can invest in self protection to reduce
their exposure to such risks.8 More recently Burke et al. (2015) and Mejia et al. (2018) also
show that the negative short- and medium-term macroeconomic e¤ects of climate change
are more concentrated in hot countries (i.e. mostly low-income countries).
Given our heterogenous sample of 174 countries and motivated by above studies, a follow-
up question is whether the estimated adverse long-run growth e¤ects we found in Specica-
tions 1 and 2 of Table 2 are driven by poor countries. We, therefore, follow Dell et al.
(2012) and Burke et al. (2015) and augment Specication 2 with an interactive term,
xi;t `  I (country i is poor), to capture any possible di¤erential e¤ects of temperature
increases (decreases) above (below) the norm for the rich and poor countries:
yit = ai +
pX
`=1
'`yi;t ` +
pX
`=0

0
`xi;t ` +
pX
`=0
 0`xi;t `  I (country i is poor) + "it; (18)
where, as in Burke et al. (2015), we dene country i as poor (rich) if its purchasing-
8For a survey of the literature on heat and productivity, see Heal and Park (2016).
20
power-parity-adjusted (PPP) GDP per capita was below (above) the global median in 1980.
Moreover, to investigate whether temperature increases a¤ect hotter countries more than
colder ones, we estimated the following panel data model
yit = ai +
pX
`=1
'`yi;t ` +
pX
`=0

0
`xi;t ` +
pX
`=0
0`xi;t `  I (country i is hot) + "it; (19)
where a country is dened as cold (hot) if its historical average temperature is below (above)
the global median. The results from estimating specications (18) and (19) are also re-
ported in Table 2. The estimated coe¢ cients of the interactive terms are not statistically
signicant we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no di¤erential e¤ects of climate
change on poor versus rich nations or hot versus cold countries. Therefore, specication 2 is
our preferred model and will be used in the counterfactual analysis in Section 4.
The results across all four specications suggest that climate change, dened as persis-
tent deviations of temperature from its historical norm, a¤ects long-run income growth neg-
atively. Specically, b
(Tit T i )
+ is always negative, with the estimates ranging from  0:0352
to  0:0692 across the two estimation techniques. Moreover, it is clear that the jackknife bias
correction makes a di¤erence as the HPJ-FE estimates (ranging from  0:0545 to  0:0692)
are always larger in absolute value than the FE estimates ( 0:0352 to  0:0476). Simi-
larly, the estimates for the coe¢ cients of
 Tit   T i;t 1 , namely b(Tit T i )  ; are also always
negative, with the estimates ranging from  0:0432 to  0:0677 across the two estimation
techniques, but the HPJ-FE estimates (ranging from  0:0480 to  0:0677) are always larger
in absolute value than the FE estimates ( 0:0432 to  0:0576). Therefore, bias correction is
essential when it comes to the counterfactual exercises in Section 4, otherwise the cumula-
tive e¤ects of climate change could be signicantly underestimated. In all cases, the speed
of adjustment to long-run equilibrium (b) is quick. However, this does not mean that the
e¤ects of changes in
 Tit   T i;t 1+ and  Tit   T i;t 1  are short lived.
The results across all specications suggest that the adverse growth e¤ects of rises in
temperature above the historical norm or falls in temperature below the historical norm are
similar. There is little evidence of asymmetry in the long-run relationship between output
growth and positive or negative deviations of temperature from its historical norm. This lack
of asymmetry suggests that a simpler specication might be preferred and we therefore re-
estimate equation (17) by replacing xit = [
 
C0it  C0i;t 1
+
,
 
C0it  C0i;t 1
 
]0, Cit = (Tit;Pit)0,
Ci;t 1 =
 T i;t 1;Pi;t 10 with xit =  Tit   T i;t 1 ; Pit   Pi;t 10. The HPJ-FE results are
reported in Table 3. Like our earlier results, permanent deviations of precipitation from their
historical norms do not a¤ect long-term growth, but permanent deviations of temperature
from their historical norms have a negative e¤ect on long-run growth (regardless of whether
21
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a country is poor or rich), with the magnitudes of the coe¢ cient of
Tit   T i;t 1 being similar
to those reported for
 Tit   T i;t 1+ and  Tit   T i;t 1  in Table 2.
To put our results into perspective, note that the integrated assessment models (IAMs)
largely postulate that climate change has only level e¤ects (or short-term growth e¤ects).
The IAMs have been extensively used in the past few decades to investigate the welfare
e¤ects of temperature increases, see Tol (2014); they have also been used as tools for policy
analyses (including by the Obama administration, see Obama (2017), and at international
forums). Even more recent studies, that use panel data models, show that temperature in-
creases reduce per capita output growth in the shortto medium-term (i.e., they have only
level e¤ects) see Dell et al. (2014) and the references therein. Burke et al. (2015) con-
sider an alternative panel specication that adds quadratic climate variables to the equation
and detect: (i) non-linearity in the relationship; (ii) di¤erential impact on rich versus poor
countries; and (iii) noisy medium-term growth e¤ects their higher lag order (between 1
and 5) estimates reported in Supplementary Table S2, show that only 3 out of 18 estimates
are statistically signicant. Overall, apart from the econometric shortcomings of existing
studies, robust evidence for the long-run growth e¤ects of climate change are nonexistent in
the literature. However, our results show that an increase in temperature above its historical
norm is associated with lower economic growth in the long run suggesting that the welfare
e¤ects of climate change are signicantly underestimated in the literature. Therefore, our
ndings call for a more forceful policy response to climate change.
3.3 Robustness to the Choice of Historical Norms
To make sure that our results are robust to the choice of historical norms, we consider
di¤erent ways of constructing T i;t 1 and Pi;t 1. Tables 35 report the results with climate
norms constructed as moving averages of the past 20 (m = 20) and 40 (m = 40) years,
respectively. As in the case with m = 30, we note that the estimated coe¢ cients of the
precipitation variables, b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
+ , b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
 , and bjPit Pi;t 1j are not statistically
signicant (Specication 1). Moreover, there is no statistically signicant di¤erence between
"rich" and "poor" or "hot" and "cold" countries given the estimates of the interactive terms
(Specications 3 and 4). However, the estimated coe¢ cients of the deviations of temperature
from its historical norm are statistically signicant in all four specications. Focusing on
Specication 2 with xit =
Tit   T i;t 1 and the HPJ-FE estimates (our preferred model and
estimator), we observe that bjTit T i;t 1j is robust to alternative ways of measuring T i;t 1,
being  0:0504(0:0191),  0:0543(0:0183), and  0:0486(0:0176) for m = 20, 30, and 40,
respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets next to these estimates.
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4 Counterfactual Analysis
We perform a number of counterfactual exercises to measure the cumulative output per
capita e¤ects of persistent increases in annual temperatures above their norms over the
period 20152100. We carry out this analysis using the HPJ-FE estimates based on the
ARDL specication given by (17), which we write equivalently as
' (L)yit = ai + 
0(L)xit + "it;
where xit =
h Tit   T i;t 1+ ;  Tit   T i;t 1 i, ' (L) = 1  P4`=1 '`Ll, (L) = P4`=0 `Ll,
and L is the lag operator. Pre-multiplying both sides of the above equation by the inverse
of ' (L) yields
yit = ~ai + (L)xit + #(L)"it; (20)
where ~ai = '(1) 1ai, #(L) = #0 + #1L+ #2L2 + : : : and  (L) = '(L) 1(L) =  
0
0 + 
0
1L+
 02L
2 + : : :, in which  0j =

 
(+)
j ;  
( )
j

for j = 0; 1; 2; : : :.  (+)j and  
( )
j are the coe¢ cients
of changes in the climate variables, 
 Ti;t j   T i;t j 1+ and   Ti;t j   T i;t j 1 , respec-
tively. To simplify the exposition, suppose that the impact of climate change above and
below the historical norm is symmetric, and consider the ARDL model:
yit = ~ai +  (L)xit + #(L)"it; (21)
where xit =
Tit   T i;t 1 ; and  (L) =P1j=0  jLj.
The counterfactual e¤ects of climate change can now be derived by comparing the output
trajectory of country i over the period T+1 to T+h under the no change scenario denoted by
b0T i and 
0
T i, with an alternative expected trajectory having the counterfactual values of b
1
T i
and 1T i. Denoting the values of xit for t = T + 1; T + 2; :::; T + h under these two scenarios
by x0i;T+1;T+h =

x0i;T+1; x
0
i;T+2; :::; x
0
i;T+h
	
, and x1i;T+1;T+h =

x1i;T+1; x
1
i;T+2; :::; x
1
i;T+h
	
, the
counterfactual output change can be written as
i;T+h = E
 
yi;T+h
zi;T ;x1i;T+1;T+h   E  yi;T+h zi;T ;x0i;T+1;T+h  ;
where ziT = (yiT ; yi;T 1; yi;T 2; ::::;xiT ; xi;T 1; xi;T 2; :::). Cumulating both sides of (21) from
t = T + 1 to T + h and taking conditional expectations under the two scenarios we have
i;T+h =
hX
j=1
 h j
 
x1i;T+j   x0i;T+j

; (22)
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The impact of climate change clearly depends on the magnitude of x1i;T+j   x0i;T+j.
We consider the output e¤ects of country-specic average annual increases in tempera-
tures over the period 20152100 as predicted under RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios, and
compare them with a baseline scenario under which temperature in each country increases
according to its historical trend of 19602014.9 However, owing to the non-linear nature of
our output-growth specication, changes in trend temperature do not translate on a one-to-
one basis to absolute changes in temperature. In line with (16), future temperature changes
over the counterfactual horizon, T + j, j = 1; 2; :::: can be represented by
Ti;T+j = aT i + bT i;j (T + j) + vT i;T+j; for j = 1; 2; :::; (23)
where we allow for the trend change in the temperature to vary over time. The above
equation reduces to (16) if we set bT i;j = bT i for all j. Suppose also that, as before, the
historical norm variable associated with Ti;T+j, namely T i;T+j 1, is constructed using the
past m years. Then it is easy to show that
Ti;T+j   T i;T+j 1 =

m+ 1
2

bT i;j + (vT i;T+j   vT i;T+j 1;m) ; j = 1; 2; :::; h; (24)
where vT i;T+j 1;m = m 1
Pm
s=1 vT i;T+j s. The realised values of
 Ti;T+j   T i;T+j 1+ and Ti;T+j   T i;T+h 1  depend on the probability distribution of weather shocks, vT i;T+j, as
well as the trend change in temperature, given by bT i;j. As a rst order approximation,
and in order to obtain analytic expressions, we assume that temperature shocks, vT i;T+j,
over j = 1; 2; :::; are serially uncorrelated, Gaussian random variables with zero means and
variances, 2T i. Under these assumptions and using the results in Lemma 3.1 of Dhyne et al.
(2011), we have
E
h Ti;T+j   T i;T+j 1+i = T i;jT i;j!T i

+ !T i

T i;j
!T i

= g+T i(m; bT i;j; T i) (25)
where (:) and (:) are the cumulative and density distribution functions of a standard
Normal variate, respectively, and
T i;j =

m+ 1
2

bT i;j, and !2T i = 
2
T i

1 +
1
m

:
9A similar analysis can also be carried out in terms of changes in precipitation. For brevity and given the
empirical results in Section 3, we focus on the counterfactual e¤ects of changes in temperature only.
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Similarly10
E
h Ti;T+j   T i;T+j 1 i =  T i;j T i;j!T i

+ !T i

T i;j
!T i

= g T i(m; bT i;j; T i); (26)
and
E
Ti;T+j   T i;T+j 1 = T i;j T i;j!T i

  
 T i;j
!T i

+2!T i

T i;j
!T i

= gT i(m; bT i;j; T i):
(27)
It is clear from the above expressions that the responses of our climate variables to a postu-
lated rise in temperature most crucially depend on the volatility of temperature around its
trend, T i, which di¤ers markedly across countries.11
For the baseline scenario, we set m = 30 and consider the following counterfactual
country-specic changes in the trend temperature over the period T + j, for j = 1; 2; ::::; H;
as compared to the historical trend rise in temperature (namely b0T i):
b1T i;j = Ti;T+j   Ti;T+j 1 = b0T i + jdi, for all j = 1; 2:::; H; (28)
where di is the average incremental change in the trend rise in temperature for country i.
We set di to ensure that the average rise in temperature over the counterfactual period in
country i is equal to the hypothesised value of b1T i, and note that
b1T i = H
 1
HX
j=1
b1T i;j = H
 1
HX
j=1
(Ti;T+j   Ti;T+j 1) = Ti;T+H   Ti;T
H
; (29)
where Ti;T+H denotes the level of temperature at the end of the counterfactual period. Av-
eraging (28) over j we have
di =
2 (b1T i   b0T i)
H + 1
: (30)
In our empirical application we set Ti;T+H = Ti;2099 and Ti;T+1 = Ti;2015, with implied H = 85.
For Ti;2099, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , we consider two sets of values based on IPCCs projections
under the RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios (see Table A.2). In e¤ect, this specication
assumes that over the counterfactual period temperature in country i increases by jdi per
annum over the period T + 1 to T + j , relative to its historical trend value of b0T i.
We also assume that the postulated trend rise in temperature, specied in (28), does
not a¤ect the volatility of temperature shocks, and set 1T i to its pre-counterfactual value of
10These results follow noting that z = z+   z and jzj = z+ + z .
11For estimates of T i across countries see Table A.2.
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0T i . This is a conservative assumption and most likely will result in an under-estimation of
the adverse e¤ects of temperature increases, since one would expect rising temperature to
be associated with an increase in volatility. With these considerations in mind, and using
(22), the mean counterfactual impact of the temperature change on output is given by (using
xit =
Tit   T i;t 1)
ih (di) = E
 
y1i;T+h jzi;T
  E  y0i;T+h jzi;T 
=
hX
j=1
 h j

gT i(m; b0T i + jdi; 
0
T i)  gT i(m; b0T i; 0T i)

; (31)
where we base the estimates of b0T i and 
0
T i on the pre-counterfactual period 1960-2014 (see
Table A.2), and use
g1T i(m; b
1
T i;j; 
0
T i) = 
1
T i;j



1T i;j
!0T i

  
 1T i;j
!0T i

+ 2!0T i

1T i;j
!0T i

; (32)
g0T i(m; b
0
T i; 
0
T i) = 
0
T i



0T i
!0T i

  
 0T i
!0T i

+ 2!0T i

0T i
!0T i

; (33)
1T i;j =

m+ 1
2
 
b1T i;j

, 0T i =

m+ 1
2

b0T i; (34)
and !0T i = 
0
T i
 
1 + 1
m
1=2
. To obtain
n
 ^j
o
; we use the HPJ-FE estimates of f`g4l=0 and
f'lg4l=1 from the ARDL equation with
Tit   T i;t 1 as the climate variable. These estimates
and their standard errors are reported in Table 6. Figure 5 plots the estimates of  j for
j = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; 20, for which the estimated mean lag is
P1
j=1 j ^jP1
j=0  ^j
= 3:1943 years.
We report the real GDP per capita losses from global warming under the RCP 2.6 and
RCP 8.5 scenarios, compared to the reference case, in country heat maps and for the year
2100 only, but make all of the 174 country-specic estimates over various horizons (by year
2030, 2050, and 2100) available in Table A.2. Figure 6 shows that in the absence of climate
change policies (under the RCP 8.5 Scenario with m = 30), the percent losses in per-capita
incomes by 2100 are sizable, regardless of whether a country is rich or poor, and hot or cold.
Nonetheless, the losses vary signicantly across countries depending on the country-specic
projected paths of temperatures. Figure 7 shows that if we managed to limit the increase in
average global temperatures to 0.01C per annum (the RCP 2.6 scenario), in line with the
Paris Agreement, we would be able to substantially reduce these losses.
Table 7 reports the real GDP per capita losses for China, the European Union, India,
Russia, and the United States, over various time horizons. As in Figure 6, income e¤ects
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Table 6: E¤ects of Climate Change on per Capita Real GDP Growth, 19602014
b0 -0.0038* b'1 0.2643*** No. of Countries (N) 174
(0.0021) (0.0500) maxT 50b1 -0.0056* b'2 0.0785*** avgT 38.36
(0.0029) (0.0266) minT 2b2 -0.0084*** b'3 0.0547** No. of Obs. (N  T ) 6,674
(0.0031) (0.0216)b3 -0.0090*** b'4 -0.0016
(0.0026) (0.0327)b4 -0.0060***
(0.0021)
Notes: Estimates are based on yit = ai+
P4
`=1 '`yi;t `+
P4
`=0 
0
`xi;t `+"it;where yit is the log of real
GDP per capita of country i in year t, xit =
Tit   T i;t 1, Tit is the population-weighted average temperature
of country i in year t, and T i;t 1 is the historical temperature norm of country i (based on moving averages
of the past 30 years). The coe¢ cients are estimated by the half-panel jackknife FE (HPJ-FE) procedure and
the standard errors are based on the estimator proposed in Proposition 4 of Chudik et al. (2018). Asterisks
indicate statistical signicance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Figure 5: f jg for j = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; 20
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Figure 6: Percent Loss in GDP per capita by 2100 in the Absence of Climate
Change Policies (RCP 8.5 Scenario)
Notes: The heat map shows ih (di), see equation (31), in year 2100 with m = 30, based on the RCP 8.5
scenario.
Figure 7: Percent Loss in GDP per capita by 2100 Abiding by the Paris Agree-
ment (RCP 2.6 Scenario)
Notes: The heat map shows ih (di), see equation (31), in year 2100 with m = 30, based on the RCP 2.6
scenario.
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Table 7: Percent Loss in GDP per capita by 2030, 2050, and 2100 under the
RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 Scenarios
Year 2030 (h = 16) Year 2050 (h = 36) Year 2100 (h = 86)
m = 20 m = 30 m = 40 m = 20 m = 30 m = 40 m = 20 m = 30 m = 40
World
RCP 2.6 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.58 1.07 1.57
RCP 8.5 0.40 0.80 1.25 1.39 2.51 3.67 4.44 7.22 9.96
China
RCP 2.6 -0.22 -0.45 -0.71 -0.38 -0.80 -1.31 0.24 0.45 0.67
RCP 8.5 0.31 0.58 0.87 0.90 1.62 2.30 2.67 4.35 5.93
European Union
RCP 2.6 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.22 0.05 0.09 0.13
RCP 8.5 0.24 0.50 0.80 0.79 1.53 2.35 2.67 4.66 6.69
India
RCP 2.6 0.12 0.26 0.42 0.41 0.81 1.27 1.44 2.57 3.69
RCP 8.5 0.60 1.16 1.78 2.13 3.62 5.08 6.37 9.90 13.39
Russia
RCP 2.6 -0.07 -0.14 -0.23 -0.16 -0.34 -0.56 -0.33 -0.71 -1.19
RCP 8.5 0.51 1.03 1.63 1.62 3.08 4.61 5.28 8.93 12.46
United States
RCP 2.6 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.29 0.60 0.96 0.98 1.88 2.84
RCP 8.5 0.60 1.20 1.86 2.13 3.77 5.39 6.66 10.52 14.32
Rich Countries
RCP 2.6 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.23 0.37 0.58 1.09 1.62
RCP 8.5 0.42 0.84 1.33 1.46 2.67 3.93 4.74 7.76 10.75
Poor Countries
RCP 2.6 -0.08 -0.16 -0.25 -0.08 -0.18 -0.32 0.55 0.99 1.43
RCP 8.5 0.37 0.72 1.09 1.24 2.18 3.11 3.78 6.05 8.25
Hot Countries
RCP 2.6 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.62 1.11 1.60
RCP 8.5 0.39 0.76 1.17 1.35 2.37 3.39 4.17 6.65 9.10
Cold Countries
RCP 2.6 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.56 1.05 1.57
RCP 8.5 0.41 0.81 1.28 1.40 2.56 3.76 4.53 7.40 10.24
Notes: We consider persistent increases in temperatures based on the RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios. Num-
bers are PPP GDP weighted averages of ih (di), see equation (31), with h = 16, 36, and 86 (corresponding
to the year 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively) and m = 20, 30, and 40.
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are substantially larger under an unmitigated path (i.e., RCP 8.5). Nonetheless, under both
scenarios, the cross-country heterogeneity is signicant. Focusing on the RCP 8.5 scenario
(with m = 30) we observe that the losses vary between 0:50 and 1:20 percent, 1:53 and 3:77
percent, and 4:35 and 10:52 percent in 2030, 2050 and 2100, respectively; with a relatively
large impact estimated for the United States in 2100 (reecting IPCCs projections of a sharp
increase in the countrys average temperature in the absence of mitigation e¤orts).
Averaging the losses across countries, using PPP-GDP weights, we report the global
income e¤ects of climate change under the RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios in Table 7.
Under the Paris agreement, and assuming m = 30, our results indicate that the world could
actually benet from mitigation policies in year 2030 (compared to a reference case in which
temperatures increase according to their historical trends of 19602014), while limiting the
economic losses of climate change to 0:11 and 1:07 percent over the next 36 and 86 years,
respectively. However, a persistent above-norm increase in average global temperature by
0.04C per year (based on RCP 8.5) leads to substantial output losses, reducing real per
capita output by 0:80, 2:51 and 7:22 percent in 2030, 2050 and 2100, respectively. Overall
these economic e¤ects are somewhat larger than those obtained in existing studies in the
literature and what is generally discussed in policy circles (see Figure 2).
A conclusion one may obtain from the literature is that the economic e¤ects of climate
change are highly uneven, with severe negative e¤ects in hot/poor countries and limited
impact on cold/rich economies (and in some studies even large gains in Canada, Russia
and most of Western Europe) examples include Annex Figure 3.6.1 in International Mon-
etary Fund (2017) and Figure 4 in Burke et al. (2015). Reporting our counterfactual results
for rich, poor, hot and cold economies (averaging the country-specic losses using PPP-GDP
weights) in Table 7, we observe that under the RCP 8.5 scenario, rich (cold) countries su¤er
from larger output per capita losses than poor (hot) economies. Under the RCP 2.6 scenario,
the e¤ects are much smaller but the rankings are somewhat similar (apart from hot countries
which experience larger income losses). Overall, abiding by the Paris Agreement would go a
long way in limiting the adverse macroeconomic e¤ects of the climate change.
Can adaptation help o¤set these negative income e¤ects? Repeating the counterfactual
exercise for di¤erent values of m highlights the role of adaptation. The shorter the m, the
faster agents treat higher temperatures as the new norm. Table 7 shows the e¤ects of global
warming over time for various values of m. The results indicate that per-capita output
losses are lower for m = 20 but signicantly higher if it takes longer to adapt to climate
change (m = 40). Overall, we argue that while climate change adaptation could reduce
these negative economic e¤ects, it is highly unlikely to o¤set them entirely. More forceful
mitigation policies are needed to limit the damage from climate change.
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5 Evidence from an Advanced Economy: The Case of
the United States
While cross-country studies are informative, they also have drawbacks. Averaging tempera-
ture and precipitation data at the country level leads to a loss of information, especially in
geographically diverse countries with varied temperature and precipitation patterns, such as
Brazil, China, India, Russia and the United States. In particular, while the national average
climate variables may be close to their historical norms, there is signicant heterogeneity
within countries. Among the countries mentioned above, the within-country geographic het-
erogeneity of the United States and its data richness enable us to compare whether economic
activity in the hotor drystates responds to a temperature increase in the same way as
economic activity does in coldor wetstates.
In this section, we use data on climate and macroeconomic variables across the 48 con-
tiguous U.S. states over the period 1963 to 2016 to check the robustness of our cross-country
results to within country climate-economy variations. Inspired by recent literature that
focuses on channels through which climate change a¤ects the economy, we consider the dif-
ferential growth e¤ects of our climate variables across the main sectors of the U.S. economy.
Details of data sources and their compilation for the purpose of this study are given in Ap-
pendix B. In addition to the climate variables, we obtain Gross State Product (GSP), GSP
per capita, and GSP per employed as well as output for ten major economic sectors.12
We showed in section 3.2 that there exists a universal long-run relationship between
climate change and economic growth across countries regardless of whether they are rich
or poor and hot or cold. We examine the validity of this nding for the case of U.S.; an
advanced economy with a high level of development and some resilience-building activities
against climate change across states. This is important as most studies in the literature
argue that climate change may only have a limited impact on economic activity of advanced
countries as they are located in temperate places.13 More generally, these ndings may be
driven by the fact that advanced economies: (i) have more economic activity taking place
indoors where air conditioners can be installed (or other measures taken),14 (ii) experience
a better di¤usion of adaptive technology, (iii) have more exible labour markets and can
optimise their use of physical capital more easily, and (iv) can a¤ord to divert part of their
12The ten sectors are: (i) Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, (ii) Mining, (iii) Construction, (iv) Man-
ufacturing, (v) Transport, Communication, and Public Utilities, (vi) Wholesale Trade, (vii) Retail Trade,
(viii) Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, (ix) Services, and (x) Government. See Table B.1.
13An exception is a recent paper by Burke and Tanutama (2019).
14Barreca et al. (2016) points to the role of air conditioning in insulating the populace from climate
change.
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Table 8: Individual U.S. State Estimates of the Average Yearly Rise in Temper-
ature Over the Period 19632016
State b^;i State b^;i State b^;i
Alabama 0.0212z Maine 0.0288z Ohio 0.0263z
Arizona 0.0318z Maryland 0.0299z Oklahoma 0.0171z
Arkansas 0.0181z Massachusetts 0.0311z Oregon 0.0198z
California 0.0270z Michigan 0.0285z Pennsylvania 0.0280z
Colorado 0.0271z Minnesota 0.0320z Rhode Island 0.0320z
Connecticut 0.0316z Mississippi 0.0205z South Carolina 0.0250z
Delaware 0.0355z Missouri 0.0179z South Dakota 0.0234z
Florida 0.0228z Montana 0.0292z Tennessee 0.0234z
Georgia 0.0228z Nebraska 0.0222z Texas 0.0245z
Idaho 0.0245z Nevada 0.0273z Utah 0.0291z
Illinois 0.0223z New Hampshire 0.0299z Vermont 0.0318z
Indiana 0.0236z New Jersey 0.0343z Virginia 0.0266z
Iowa 0.0198z New Mexico 0.0300z Washington 0.0186z
Kansas 0.0186z New York 0.0308z West Virginia 0.0268z
Kentucky 0.0250z North Carolina 0.0257z Wisconsin 0.0307z
Louisiana 0.0210z North Dakota 0.0263z Wyoming 0.0279z
Notes: bbT i are the individual state-level estimates based on the regressions Tit = aT i + bT it + vT ;it, where
Tit denotes the average temperature (C) in state i in year t. z indicates statistical signicance at the 1%
level.
investment to adaptive measures given their level of development.
5.1 Long-Run Impact of Climate Change on U.S. Economic Growth
We rst examine whether temperature across the 48 U.S. states has been increasing over
the period 1963 to 2016 by estimating equation (16). Our results suggest that, on average,
temperature in the 48 U.S. states has risen by 0:026 degrees Celsius (C) per year over
19632016 (i.e., b^T = 0:0260 (0:0007); with the standard error in brackets), with this trend
estimate being statistically signicant at the 1% level. Compared to our cross-country sample
(see Table 1), there is, as to be expected, less heterogeneity across the 48 U.S. states, with
all states experiencing statistically signicant increases in temperature over time (see Table
8). But, the 48 U.S. states as a whole underwent more warming than the world on average.
The U.S. average per annum temperature increase of 0:026 was appreciably higher than the
world average rise of 0:018 per annum, which is close to that for Oklahoma, the state which
saw the lowest average increase in temperature.
Having shown that temperature is trended across the sample of 48 U.S. states, we examine
the long-run impact of climate change on aggregate state-level economic activity as well as
statessectoral outputs. Such a within-country study is scant in the literature as priority is
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given to studying the impact of climate change on a particular sector of an economy (e.g.,
agricultural output) or to cross-country analyses. As in the cross-country study in Section
3.2, we estimate the panel ARDL model (17) for the 48 U.S. states, but with yit denoting
an economic indicator (for instance, GSP or sectoral output) of state i in year t.
Table 9 reports the long-run estimates of the climate change variables on growth rates
of real GSP and real GSP per capita for the 48 U.S. states over the period 19632016.
We construct the climate variables with historical norms computed using 20, 30, and 40
years moving-averages, and consider the estimates based on the 30-year moving averages as
our central estimates. We observe that the estimated long-run coe¢ cients b
(Tit T i;t 1)
  ;b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
+, and b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
  are negative and statistically signicant in all cases except
for one. Climate change a¤ects the U.S. ecosystem not only through increases in average
temperatures, but also through changes in the extremes more intense droughts; heavier
snow and rainfall; as well as extreme cold. However, b
(Tit T i;t 1)
+ is not statistically signi-
cant in three out of six specications. While this nding might be explained by the improving
resilience of the U.S. economy to increasing temperature brought by climate change,15 the
evidence for excessive temperature not a¤ecting the U.S. economy is not conclusive as we
will explain below.
While in our cross-country analysis, we did not nd any statistically signicant impact
from deviations of precipitation from its historical norms on output growth (see Tables 25),
in our within-country study of the United States, we nd that deviations of precipitation
above and below its historical norm a¤ect various measures of state-level economic activity
and these estimates are statistically signicant.16 This is because averaging precipitation at
the country level leads to a loss of information, especially in geographically diverse countries
with varied precipitation patterns. While the national average precipitation may be close
to its historical norm, there is signicant heterogeneity across states with some experiencing
plenty of rain and snow and others, like California, su¤ering from drought for many years.
By conducting a within-country study, we account for the variation of precipitation across
the states, which is important and does indeed a¤ect economic activity (Table 9).
Considering the richness of our U.S. database, which includes data on state-level em-
ployment from 1976, we can also examine the long-run impact of climate change on labour
productivity and employment growth directly, in addition to re-estimating the regressions
over the period 19762016. We, therefore, re-estimate the model for an extended set of
outcome variables, with yit being the natural logarithm of: (i) real GSP, (ii) real GSP per
15For example, currently about 90 percent of American households have air conditioning.
16The importance of focusing on deviations of climate variables from their historical norms is also high-
lighted by recent research which demonstrate that di¤erent regions of the United States have acclimated
themselves to their own temperature niche; see, for instance, Heutel et al. (2016).
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capita, (iii) real GSP per employed (measuring labour productivity), or (iv) employment,
but over the period 1976 to 2016. These results are reported in Table 10. Across all spec-
ications, the estimated long-run coe¢ cients b
(Tit T i;t 1)
  and b
(Pit Pi;t 1)
  are negative
and statistically signicant at the 1% level for almost all outcome variables. Therefore, when
temperature and precipitation fall below their historical norms, state-level economic activity
su¤ers, employment declines, and labour productivity growth falls (for b
(Tit T i;t 1)
 ).
While in Table 9, the climate variable (Tit T it 1)+, did not have a statistically signicant
impact on state-level output growth in three out of six specications (over the period 1963
2016), the results change substantially when we consider the 19762016 sub-sample in Table
10. Consistent with our cross-country estimates, b
(Tit T i;t 1)
+ is now negative and statisti-
cally signicant for various specications and dependent variables: real GSP, real GSP per
capita, real GSP per employed, and employment. The size of the estimates for b
(Tit T i;t 1)
+
is smaller in absolute value than those obtained in our cross-country regressions (Table 2),
reecting a higher degree of adaptation in the United States to climate change. Nonetheless,
contrary to most studies in the literature, our estimates are not negligible. Our results are
supported by Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) and Behrer and Park (2017), who exploit county-
level variations in climate variables over time in the U.S. and nd that hotter temperatures
damage economic activity, and also by Colacito et al. (2019) who nd that an increase in
summer temperatures has adverse e¤ects on nominal GSP growth in the United States.
If the U.S. economy were adapting to climate change, should we not expect the negative
impact of deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical norms to be
shrinking over time? To investigate this hypothesis, we re-estimate the model over di¤erent
time windows using real GSP per capita growth as the dependent variable. We start with
the full sample, 19632016, and then drop a year at a time (with the last estimation being
carried out for the sub-sample 19832016). The results are plotted in Figure 8, showing that
the estimated coe¢ cients are becoming larger (in absolute value) over time.
Do these results cast doubt on the e¢ cacy of adaptation e¤orts in the United States
over the last ve decades? Ceteris paribus, while it is expected that adaptation weakens the
relationship between climate change and economic growth over time, we cannot conclude
that the U.S. economy has not been adapting to climate change based on Figure 8. First,
adaptation e¤orts might be concentrated in certain sectors. Second, it may be the case that
adaptation is not keeping pace with climate change; i.e., global temperatures have increased
at an unprecedented pace over the past 40 years. Third, if rms underestimate the likelihood
or severity of future weather events, they may not adapt su¢ ciently; i.e. adaptation tech-
nologies are readily available but the take-up is limited by rms. In a survey of private sector
organizations across multiple industries within the Organization for Economic Cooperation
38
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Figure 8: Long-Run E¤ects of Climate Change on per capita Real GSP Growth
in the United States, 19632016
Notes: Figures show the long-run e¤ects (and their 95% standard error bands) of climate change on state-
level economic growth in the United States over di¤erent windows, using the ARDL specication (17). We
start the estimation with the full sample (19632016) and then drop one year at a time, ending with the
nal estimates based on the 19832016 sub-sample.
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and Development (OECD) countries, Agrawala et al. (2011) nd that only few rms have
taken su¢ cient steps to assess and manage the risks from climate change. Fourth, according
to Deryugina and Hsiang (2014) rms tend to under-invest in adaptation owing to its high
cost. We argue that there has been some adaptation in the U.S. given that the estimates in
Tables 9 and 10 are generally smaller than those obtained in our cross-country study (Table
2). However, overall, the evidence appears to suggest that (at least for now) adaptation has
had limited impact in dampening the negative e¤ects of climate change in the United States.
5.2 Further Evidence from U.S. Sector Level Data
Adaptation and mitigation can occur in the short-term through a reallocation of resources,
and in the long-term through investment in research and development, innovation, or a shift
in the economic structure of the country towards an industry mix that is less vulnerable to
climate change. Given that adaptation is relatively easier and more e¤ective to implement in
some industries than others, we rst need to assess which sectors/industries are more likely to
be a¤ected by climate change in the U.S. economy. Focusing on di¤erent sectors/industries
also helps shed light on the channels through which climate change a¤ects the United States
economy. We consider ten sectors, and due to lack of worker per sector data at the state
level, we only report the results for state-level output growth.17
The long-run sectoral e¤ects of climate change estimated on the panel of the 48 U.S.
states over the period 1963-2016 are reported in Table 11. The estimates show that the
impact is broad based each of the 10 sectors is a¤ected by at least one of the four climate
variables. Specically, the agricultural sector is negatively impacted by a rise in temperature
above its historical norm, b
(Tit T i;t 1)
+ < 0. In addition, precipitation above and below the
norm also exert negative e¤ects on agricultural output growth. These results are in line with
the ndings of Burke and Emerick (2016), who consider corn and soy farming in the U.S. over
the period 1955-2005, and nd that, despite some adaptation e¤orts by farmers, agricultural
output is damaged by extreme heat and excessive precipitation. Note also that the cost of
adaptation to climate change is high in the agricultural sector constructing greenhouses or
varying crop mixes involves heftier investments than tting air conditioning units in o¢ ces.
Table 11 also illustrates that deviations of all four climate variables from their historical
norms have adverse e¤ects on output growth in the manufacturing sector. While the negative
impact of climate change on agricultural production is well studied, the adverse e¤ects on
the manufacturing sector in the United States are only being discussed in the new climate
economy literature (using micro-data analyses). For example, Cachon et al. (2012) use
17See Appendix B for further details.
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weekly production data from 64 automobile plants in the U.S. and nd that climate variations
(extensive periods of rain and snow, high heat, and severe winds), lead to costly production
volatility, and have adverse e¤ects on labour productivity, in line with our results. Moreover,
our estimates show that output growth in mining, construction, transport, retail trade,
wholesale trade, services and government sectors are all negatively a¤ected by unusually
cold days in the U.S. as consumer spending falls (households may delay shopping or even
cut from spending owing to higher heating costs or home-repair expenses); supply chains are
interrupted;18 and construction projects are delayed. See also Bloesch and Gourio (2015)
for further supporting evidence. Heavy rain can also reduce access to mountainous mining
regions, where large deposits are generally found, thereby reducing output growth in the
mining sector. Construction and transportation activities are also a¤ected by rain/snow.
Most discussions of climate change focus on the expected increase in average global
temperatures over the next century (i.e. global warming). However, the frequency and
severity of weather events (such as heat or cold waves, droughts and oods, as well as
natural disasters) depend heavily on the variability of temperatures and precipitation as well
as their mean. The larger the swings, the more often extremely hot or cold and wet or dry
conditions can wreak havoc; see, for instance, Swain et al. 2018. Given current projections
of rising average global temperature over the next century, the likelihood that temperatures
persistently drift above their historical norm is very high. As we showed above, this could
lead to a permanent negative impact on state-level output growth (that is lower production
growth in all sectors of the United States economy apart from the mining, government, and
nance, insurance and real estate sectors). While persistent deviations of precipitation from
its historical norm (either above and below) or below-the-norm temperatures are less likely,
the swings (variability) could be unprecedentedly large owing to climate change, and hence,
the negative impact on state-level output growth could be sizable and long lasting.
Overall, the industry-level results in Table 11 and the state-level results in Tables 9
10, show that deviations of temperature below its historical norms in the U.S. as well as
deviations of precipitation from its historical norm are detrimental to long-run state-level
and industry-level output growth. When it comes to deviations of temperature above its
historical norms, the estimates are negative in the more recent sample for all economic
sectors apart from mining, government, and nance, insurance and real estate sectors. In
fact b
(Tit T i;t 1)
+ is positive and statistically signicant for government services (at the 10%
level) and nance, insurance and real estate sectors, but most likely this reects government
spending on relief measures and higher insurance premiums in response to climate change.
18For example, steel production along the coast of Lake Michigan was majorly disrupted during the brutal
2013-14 winter, because frozen Great Lakes meant that cargoes could not be moved via boats as usual.
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We acknowledge some resilience building activities in advanced economies, but the ev-
idence from both the cross-country analysis and the U.S. within-country study seems to
suggest that while adaptation might have reduced the negative e¤ects in certain sectors,
it has not completely o¤set them at the macro level (see Table 10 and Figure 8). Behrer
and Park (2017) note that even the most well-adapted regions in the United States su¤er
negative production e¤ects from hotter temperatures and Colacito et al. (2019) show that
an increase in average summer temperatures will have negative e¤ects on nominal output in
various sectors, such as agriculture, construction, retail, services, and wholesale trade.
6 Concluding Remarks
Using data on 174 countries over the period 1960 to 2014, and a novel econometric strat-
egy (that di¤erentiates between short-term and long-run e¤ects; accounts for bi-directional
feedbacks between economic growth and climate change; and deals with temperature being
trended), we showed that persistent changes in climate has long-term negative impacts on
economic growth. If temperature deviates from its historical norm by 0:01C annually, long-
term income growth will be lower by 0:0543 percentage points per year. Furthermore, in
contrast to most of the literature, we illustrated that these negative long-run growth e¤ects
are universal, that is they a¤ect all countries, rich or poor, and hot or cold.
We performed a number of counterfactual exercises where we investigated the output
e¤ects of annual increases in temperatures under mitigated and unmitigated scenarios during
20152100. We showed that keeping the increase in the global average temperature to below
2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels as agreed by 190 parties in Paris in December
2015, will reduce global income by 1:07 percent by 2100. However, an increase in average
global temperatures of 0:04C (corresponding to the RCP 8.5 scenario, which assumes higher
greenhouse gas emissions in absence of climate change policies) reduces worlds real GDP
per capita by 7:22 percent by 2100, with the size of these income e¤ects varying signicantly
across countries. Overall, abiding by the Paris Agreement would go a long way in limiting
economic losses from climate change across almost all countries.
These e¤ects are somewhat larger than those generally discussed in policy circles. For
instance, the integrated assessment models, which have been extensively used to inform
climate policy (including by the Obama administration, see Obama 2017) and are the basis
for international negotiations, usually postulate that an increase in temperature only has
short-term growth e¤ects (or permanent level e¤ects). However, we showed that persistent
changes in climate lowers long-term economic growth. We illustrated that while adaptation
to climate change could reduce these negative long-run growth e¤ects, it is highly unlikely
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to o¤set them entirely. Therefore, our ndings call for a more forceful policy response to the
threat of climate change, including more ambitious mitigation and adaptation e¤orts.
We also examined the robustness of our ndings, using panel data sets of di¤erent eco-
nomic indicators across 48 U.S. states over the period 1963 to 2016. Our results provided
evidence for the damage climate change causes in the United States using GSP, GSP per
capita, labour productivity, and employment as well as output growth in ten economic sec-
tors (such as agriculture, construction, manufacturing, services, retail and wholesale trade).
While certain sectors in the U.S. economy might have adapted to higher temperatures,
economic activity in the U.S. overall and at the sectoral level continues to be sensitive to
deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical norms.
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A Additional Results
Figure A.1: Global Land-Surface Air and Sea-Surface Water Temperatures (De-
grees Celsius, 1960 = 0)
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Notes: The left panel shows the global land-surface air and sea-surface water temperatures, and the right
panel shows the global land-surface air temperatures, both over the 19002014 period. The blue lines show the
temperatures observed by the National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) at National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); and the broken red lines show the temperatures observed by the
Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
The temperatures in 1960 are standardised to zero.
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Table A.1: Individual Country Estimates of the Average Yearly Rise in Temper-
ature Over the Period 19002014
Country bbT i Country bbT i Country bbT i
Afghanistan 0.0136*** Georgia 0.0044** Oman 0.0047***
Albania 0.0036** Germany 0.0063*** Pakistan 0.0043***
Algeria 0.0067*** Ghana 0.0035*** Panama 0.0060***
Angola 0.0099*** Greece -0.0008 Papua New Guinea 0.0026**
Argentina 0.0038*** Greenland 0.0110*** Paraguay 0.0032**
Armenia 0.0056** Guatemala 0.0065*** Peru 0.0039***
Australia 0.0041*** Guinea 0.0028*** Philippines 0.0048***
Austria 0.0056*** Guinea-Bissau 0.0051*** Poland 0.0063***
Azerbaijan 0.0064*** Guyana 0.0051*** Portugal 0.0051***
Bahamas 0.0048*** Haiti 0.0190*** Puerto Rico 0.0023***
Bangladesh 0.0033*** Honduras 0.0086*** Qatar 0.0125***
Belarus 0.0094*** Hungary 0.0033* Romania 0.0043**
Belgium 0.0057*** Iceland 0.0034* Russian Federation 0.0111***
Belize 0.0041*** India 0.0029*** Rwanda 0.0050***
Benin 0.0032*** Indonesia 0.0025*** Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0050***
Bhutan 0.0055*** Iran 0.0072*** Samoa 0.0050***
Bolivia 0.0011 Iraq 0.0083*** Sao Tome and Principe 0.0071***
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0106*** Ireland 0.0057*** Saudi Arabia 0.0070***
Botswana 0.0098*** Israel 0.0047*** Senegal 0.0074***
Brazil 0.0061*** Italy 0.0045*** Serbia 0.0038**
Brunei Darussalam 0.0002 Jamaica 0.0134*** Sierra Leone 0.0031***
Bulgaria 0.0012 Japan 0.0099*** Slovakia 0.0061***
Burkina Faso 0.0045*** Jordan 0.0032* Slovenia 0.0062***
Burundi 0.0075*** Kazakhstan 0.0122*** Solomon Islands 0.0020**
Cabo Verde 0.0039*** Kenya 0.0026*** Somalia 0.0071***
Cambodia 0.0045*** Kuwait 0.0091*** South Africa 0.0051***
Cameroon 0.0039*** Kyrgyzstan 0.0146*** South Korea 0.0101***
Canada 0.0110*** Laos 0.0028*** South Sudan 0.0102***
Central African Republic 0.0020** Latvia 0.0094*** Spain 0.0080***
Chad 0.0048*** Lebanon 0.0030* Sri Lanka 0.0050***
Chile 0.0017** Lesotho 0.0026** Sudan 0.0102***
China 0.0064*** Liberia 0.0018** Suriname 0.0012
Colombia 0.0098*** Libya 0.0076*** Swaziland 0.0103***
Comoros 0.0053*** Lithuania 0.0080*** Sweden 0.0064**
Congo 0.0064*** Luxembourg 0.0050*** Switzerland 0.0046***
Congo DRC 0.0051*** Macedonia -0.0000 Syria 0.0055***
Costa Rica 0.0031* Madagascar 0.0018* Tajikistan 0.0099***
Côte dIvoire 0.0013 Malawi 0.0162*** Tanzania 0.0026***
Croatia 0.0039** Malaysia 0.0014* Thailand 0.0012
Cuba 0.0021*** Mali 0.0057*** Togo 0.0023**
Cyprus 0.0080*** Mauritania 0.0083*** Trinidad and Tobago 0.0035**
Czech Republic 0.0040** Mauritius 0.0053*** Tunisia 0.0087***
Denmark 0.0044** Mexico 0.0060*** Turkey 0.0045**
Djibouti 0.0057*** Moldova 0.0089*** Turkmenistan 0.0092***
Dominican Republic 0.0111*** Mongolia 0.0111*** Uganda 0.0048***
Ecuador 0.0091*** Montenegro 0.0070*** Ukraine 0.0089***
Egypt 0.0056*** Morocco 0.0041*** United Arab Emirates 0.0055***
El Salvador 0.0050** Mozambique 0.0134*** United Kingdom 0.0038***
Equatorial Guinea 0.0093*** Myanmar 0.0051*** United States 0.0036***
Eritrea 0.0046*** Namibia 0.0093*** Uruguay 0.0064***
Estonia 0.0093*** Nepal 0.0039*** US Virgin Islands 0.0069***
Ethiopia 0.0049*** Netherlands 0.0043** Uzbekistan 0.0096***
Fiji 0.0045*** New Caledonia 0.0006 Vanuatu 0.0043***
Finland 0.0070** New Zealand 0.0043*** Venezuela 0.0152***
France 0.0069*** Nicaragua 0.0086*** Vietnam 0.0015*
French Polynesia 0.0062*** Niger 0.0009 Yemen 0.0154***
Gabon 0.0074*** Nigeria 0.0044*** Zambia 0.0033**
Gambia 0.0046*** Norway 0.0054** Zimbabwe 0.0066***
Notes: bbT i is the OLS estimate of bT i in the country-specic regressions Tit = aT i + bT it+ vT ;it, where Tit
denotes the population-weighted average temperature (C). Asterisks indicate statistical signicance at the
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
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Table A.2: Percent Loss in GDP per capita by 2030, 2050, and 2100 under the
RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 Scenarios
Key Variables in Equation (31) Percent Loss in GDP per capita
T i bb0T i bT i di RCP 2.6 Scenario RCP 8.5 Scenario
RCP 2.6 RCP 8.5 2030 2050 2100 2030 2050 2100
Afghanistan 12.35 0.039 0.61 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.35 -0.78 -1.18 0.70 1.96 5.54
Albania 12.94 0.024 0.48 0.0002 0.0014 0.15 0.42 1.22 1.03 3.13 8.86
Algeria 23.02 0.029 0.41 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.59 -0.94 1.33 0.34 0.92 2.56
Angola 21.90 0.019 0.34 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.14 -0.31 -0.52 0.71 2.09 5.84
Argentina 14.14 0.007 0.29 0.0005 0.0013 0.20 0.71 2.50 0.79 2.78 8.17
Armenia 7.82 0.014 0.82 0.0000 0.0012 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.42 1.57 6.03
Australia 21.69 0.009 0.35 0.0002 0.0011 0.06 0.17 0.56 0.64 2.25 6.93
Austria 6.94 0.017 0.54 0.0001 0.0013 0.06 0.16 0.46 0.71 2.39 7.58
Azerbaijan 12.99 0.019 0.65 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.21 -0.23 1.25 0.18 0.54 1.80
Bahamas 25.59 0.020 0.28 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.50 -0.52 2.34 -0.08 -0.20 -0.44
Bangladesh 25.55 -0.001 0.26 0.0005 0.0014 0.06 0.42 2.15 0.55 2.68 8.59
Belarus 6.21 0.032 0.83 -0.0003 0.0009 -0.12 -0.28 -0.54 0.52 1.58 5.04
Belgium 9.45 0.026 0.64 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.23 -0.47 -0.29 0.25 0.71 2.17
Belize 25.54 0.011 0.27 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.04 -0.09 -0.18 0.55 1.75 5.10
Benin 27.38 0.018 0.25 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.22 -0.48 -0.50 0.59 1.65 4.43
Bhutan 7.84 0.014 0.36 0.0016 0.0026 1.18 3.70 10.33 2.23 6.64 17.76
Bolivia 21.47 0.000 0.33 0.0003 0.0015 0.02 0.15 0.90 0.53 2.64 8.82
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.96 0.037 0.58 0.0004 0.0015 0.27 0.74 2.07 1.24 3.56 9.75
Botswana 21.96 0.026 0.62 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.13 -0.30 -0.53 0.67 2.07 6.37
Brazil 24.45 0.016 0.24 0.0000 0.0011 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.99 2.79 7.35
Brunei Darussalam 26.84 0.010 0.27 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.15 -0.07 1.41 0.16 0.50 1.65
Bulgaria 9.97 0.012 0.51 0.0009 0.0021 0.39 1.39 4.84 1.24 4.41 13.16
Burkina Faso 28.40 0.019 0.29 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.26 -0.53 -0.26 0.60 1.72 4.71
Burundi 20.28 0.019 0.43 0.0001 0.0012 0.08 0.21 0.59 0.81 2.56 7.46
Cabo Verde 21.02 0.018 0.46 0.0002 0.0009 0.10 0.27 0.80 0.57 1.80 5.54
Cambodia 26.95 0.017 0.29 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.36 -0.38 1.84 0.10 0.26 0.74
Cameroon 24.43 0.012 0.29 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.13 -0.23 0.08 0.39 1.23 3.75
Canada -6.20 0.030 0.77 0.0004 0.0021 0.20 0.56 1.68 1.37 4.40 13.08
Central African Republic 25.30 0.010 0.32 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.05 -0.11 -0.15 0.49 1.65 5.12
Chad 27.57 0.018 0.46 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.31 -0.18 2.65 0.11 0.31 0.92
Chile 8.16 0.010 0.31 0.0008 0.0017 0.50 1.68 5.18 1.23 3.97 11.08
China 6.68 0.023 0.30 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.45 -0.80 0.45 0.58 1.62 4.35
Colombia 24.65 0.006 0.28 0.0000 0.0010 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.52 1.93 6.02
Comoros 25.08 0.006 0.40 0.0004 0.0012 0.11 0.39 1.57 0.49 1.97 6.71
Congo 24.63 0.015 0.25 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.12 -0.27 -0.40 0.62 1.81 4.99
Congo DRC 23.92 0.015 0.26 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.09 -0.22 -0.41 0.73 2.13 5.81
Costa Rica 23.41 0.017 0.35 0.0007 0.0015 0.49 1.47 4.33 1.20 3.64 9.95
Côte dIvoire 26.35 0.013 0.27 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.15 -0.29 -0.09 0.45 1.37 3.96
Croatia 11.27 0.025 0.58 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.10 -0.24 -0.46 0.59 1.79 5.52
Cuba 25.39 -0.001 0.28 0.0005 0.0013 0.06 0.44 2.26 0.44 2.28 7.68
Cyprus 18.67 0.015 0.48 -0.0001 0.0009 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.50 1.66 5.37
Czech Republic 7.47 0.019 0.64 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.07 -0.16 -0.28 0.41 1.33 4.52
Denmark 7.90 0.019 0.74 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.13 -0.24 -0.02 0.16 0.49 1.63
Djibouti 28.00 0.013 0.35 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.25 0.17 3.62 0.03 0.08 0.22
Dominican Republic 25.19 0.015 0.37 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.08 -0.18 -0.31 0.35 1.06 3.31
Ecuador 22.32 -0.003 0.39 0.0005 0.0014 0.00 0.19 1.49 0.27 1.94 7.70
Egypt 22.20 0.027 0.44 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.29 -0.61 -0.69 0.63 1.79 5.06
El Salvador 24.59 0.032 0.37 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.05 -0.12 -0.31 0.76 2.08 5.50
Equatorial Guinea 24.32 0.027 0.45 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.40 -0.76 -0.02 0.14 0.36 1.00
Eritrea 25.95 0.018 0.50 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.07 -0.16 -0.29 0.53 1.70 5.42
Estonia 5.22 0.033 0.89 -0.0007 0.0005 -0.27 -0.54 -0.33 0.28 0.80 2.47
Ethiopia 22.58 0.022 0.25 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.30 -0.66 -0.72 0.56 1.52 4.00
Fiji 24.45 0.011 0.27 0.0004 0.0011 0.25 0.77 2.39 0.81 2.54 7.12
Finland 1.47 0.030 0.96 -0.0011 0.0003 -0.35 -0.46 1.48 0.12 0.34 1.02
France 10.55 0.022 0.50 -0.0001 0.0010 -0.03 -0.07 -0.17 0.62 1.92 5.82
French Polynesia 23.83 0.024 0.30 0.0005 0.0011 0.43 1.17 3.16 1.03 2.83 7.43
Gabon 24.44 0.018 0.32 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.10 -0.24 -0.45 0.55 1.61 4.56
Gambia 26.43 0.023 0.32 0.0002 0.0012 0.20 0.53 1.44 1.15 3.20 8.43
Notes: We consider persistent increases in temperatures based on the RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios. The losses are based on
ih (di), see equation (31), with h = 16, 36, and 86 (corresponding to the year 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively) and m = 30.51
Table A.2: Percent Loss in GDP per capita by 2030, 2050, and 2100 under the
RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 Scenarios (continued)
Key Variables in Equation (31) Percent Loss in GDP per capita
T i bb0T i bT i di RCP 2.6 Scenario RCP 8.5 Scenario
RCP 2.6 RCP 8.5 2030 2050 2100 2030 2050 2100
Georgia 8.73 0.016 0.67 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.09 -0.18 -0.05 0.33 1.12 4.01
Germany 8.47 0.023 0.65 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.22 -0.39 0.08 0.21 0.61 1.92
Ghana 27.14 0.018 0.24 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.31 -0.61 -0.10 0.43 1.18 3.17
Greece 13.82 0.011 0.49 0.0008 0.0019 0.35 1.26 4.45 1.12 4.04 12.21
Greenland -19.71 0.038 0.73 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.42 -0.85 -0.52 0.49 1.39 4.10
Guatemala 23.56 0.028 0.28 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.16 -0.40 -0.89 0.80 2.12 5.48
Guinea 25.53 0.017 0.25 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.12 -0.28 -0.50 0.71 2.03 5.45
Guinea-Bissau 26.74 0.024 0.28 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.20 -0.47 -0.88 0.70 1.91 5.02
Guyana 25.98 0.003 0.33 0.0003 0.0013 0.07 0.27 1.21 0.56 2.42 7.89
Haiti 24.55 0.016 0.53 0.0001 0.0009 0.04 0.10 0.27 0.45 1.49 4.95
Honduras 25.27 0.021 0.35 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.19 -0.42 -0.57 0.46 1.33 3.78
Hungary 10.33 0.016 0.64 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.07 -0.15 -0.20 0.41 1.41 4.96
Iceland 1.10 0.021 0.65 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.23 -0.32 0.83 0.12 0.33 1.00
India 23.99 0.009 0.25 0.0004 0.0015 0.26 0.81 2.57 1.16 3.62 9.90
Indonesia 25.40 0.005 0.15 0.0003 0.0011 0.19 0.61 1.92 0.91 2.79 7.51
Iran 17.33 0.023 0.52 -0.0001 0.0012 -0.04 -0.10 -0.23 0.83 2.59 7.65
Iraq 22.11 0.024 0.67 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.28 -0.44 0.73 0.29 0.86 2.74
Ireland 9.34 0.015 0.41 0.0001 0.0008 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.46 1.47 4.62
Israel 20.31 0.017 0.55 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.12 -0.24 -0.08 0.36 1.15 3.87
Italy 12.21 0.028 0.43 0.0000 0.0011 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.89 2.56 7.01
Jamaica 25.18 0.020 0.35 0.0000 0.0007 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.59 1.71 4.80
Japan 11.18 0.013 0.40 0.0006 0.0017 0.33 1.06 3.47 1.12 3.72 10.70
Jordan 18.56 0.015 0.62 0.0002 0.0015 0.08 0.22 0.70 0.72 2.61 8.69
Kazakhstan 6.00 0.024 0.80 0.0010 0.0023 0.46 1.48 5.02 1.35 4.65 14.33
Kenya 24.46 0.018 0.31 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.29 -0.48 0.50 0.29 0.82 2.39
Kuwait 25.61 0.025 0.54 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.35 -0.58 0.60 0.39 1.14 3.46
Kyrgyzstan 1.75 0.028 0.52 0.0003 0.0017 0.18 0.48 1.36 1.31 3.91 10.85
Laos 23.20 0.009 0.39 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.09 -0.07 0.78 0.19 0.65 2.34
Latvia 5.82 0.030 0.85 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.18 -0.40 -0.52 0.36 1.08 3.46
Lebanon 15.19 0.025 0.59 0.0009 0.0019 0.53 1.63 5.06 1.36 4.30 12.35
Lesotho 11.75 0.010 0.46 0.0008 0.0020 0.36 1.30 4.61 1.16 4.22 12.60
Liberia 25.66 0.009 0.22 0.0001 0.0009 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.66 2.07 5.76
Libya 22.34 0.033 0.36 -0.0012 0.0000 -0.91 -1.31 2.50 0.03 0.07 0.19
Lithuania 6.42 0.028 0.84 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.12 -0.27 -0.45 0.41 1.26 4.16
Luxembourg 9.07 0.028 0.65 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.29 -0.56 -0.12 0.19 0.54 1.60
Macedonia 10.31 0.013 0.54 0.0007 0.0019 0.28 0.96 3.46 1.08 3.92 12.04
Madagascar 22.87 0.021 0.28 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.20 -0.45 -0.75 0.55 1.54 4.14
Malawi 22.26 0.023 0.34 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.29 -0.62 -0.57 0.62 1.76 4.81
Malaysia 25.30 0.013 0.21 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.15 -0.31 -0.34 0.53 1.51 4.12
Mali 28.70 0.021 0.38 -0.0004 0.0009 -0.24 -0.50 -0.38 0.67 1.96 5.53
Mauritania 27.68 0.024 0.44 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.26 -0.54 -0.47 0.63 1.86 5.33
Mauritius 23.92 0.022 0.30 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.38 -0.70 0.15 0.13 0.34 0.92
Mexico 20.43 0.012 0.25 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.10 -0.21 -0.23 0.64 1.97 5.54
Moldova 9.37 0.020 0.78 0.0004 0.0016 0.17 0.50 1.68 0.81 2.85 9.51
Mongolia 0.15 0.028 0.66 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.16 -0.35 -0.57 0.68 2.11 6.52
Montenegro 8.54 0.020 0.48 0.0015 0.0026 1.05 3.33 9.64 2.09 6.42 17.50
Morocco 18.77 0.021 0.44 -0.0003 0.0009 -0.18 -0.38 -0.44 0.65 1.97 5.80
Mozambique 24.20 0.015 0.33 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.16 -0.31 -0.02 0.47 1.46 4.35
Myanmar 22.98 0.020 0.30 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.34 -0.61 0.25 0.29 0.80 2.24
Namibia 19.57 0.026 0.50 0.0004 0.0015 0.27 0.77 2.26 1.20 3.58 9.99
Nepal 15.13 0.018 0.38 0.0009 0.0020 0.59 1.82 5.34 1.61 4.86 13.15
Netherlands 9.71 0.024 0.65 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.24 -0.43 0.13 0.15 0.42 1.27
New Caledonia 21.43 0.012 0.36 0.0008 0.0015 0.44 1.45 4.62 1.02 3.39 9.73
New Zealand 10.16 0.002 0.39 0.0009 0.0017 0.23 1.17 4.78 0.70 3.18 10.35
Nicaragua 26.18 0.029 0.34 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.57 -1.05 0.32 0.08 0.22 0.58
Niger 27.60 0.008 0.57 -0.0007 0.0005 -0.05 0.13 1.74 0.14 0.51 2.12
Nigeria 26.87 0.016 0.30 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.23 -0.42 0.08 0.42 1.24 3.56
Norway 1.35 0.023 0.75 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.23 -0.36 0.62 0.19 0.56 1.80
Notes: We consider persistent increases in temperatures based on the RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios. The losses are based on
ih (di), see equation (31), with h = 16, 36, and 86 (corresponding to the year 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively) and m = 30.
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Table A.2: Percent Loss in GDP per capita by 2030, 2050, and 2100 under the
RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 Scenarios (continued)
Key Variables in Equation (31) Percent Loss in GDP per capita
T i bb0T i bT i di RCP 2.6 Scenario RCP 8.5 Scenario
RCP 2.6 RCP 8.5 2030 2050 2100 2030 2050 2100
Oman 26.79 0.008 0.31 0.0002 0.0013 0.08 0.26 0.87 0.81 2.83 8.31
Pakistan 20.43 0.010 0.40 0.0002 0.0015 0.08 0.26 0.88 0.88 3.16 9.55
Panama 25.12 0.017 0.31 0.0000 0.0008 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.63 1.87 5.27
Papua New Guinea 23.80 0.007 0.19 0.0003 0.0011 0.15 0.45 1.44 0.82 2.55 6.99
Paraguay 23.72 0.005 0.50 0.0003 0.0014 0.06 0.23 1.02 0.49 2.21 8.01
Peru 19.96 0.007 0.32 0.0002 0.0012 0.05 0.16 0.55 0.66 2.46 7.61
Philippines 25.42 0.007 0.20 0.0005 0.0013 0.29 0.98 3.05 0.98 3.09 8.46
Poland 7.84 0.026 0.76 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.12 -0.27 -0.43 0.38 1.16 3.83
Portugal 15.20 0.010 0.42 0.0002 0.0013 0.07 0.22 0.72 0.68 2.46 7.75
Puerto Rico 23.53 0.006 0.30 0.0006 0.0013 0.24 0.89 3.16 0.71 2.62 7.92
Qatar 26.79 0.027 0.51 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.25 -0.54 -0.62 0.60 1.77 5.15
Romania 8.91 0.019 0.62 0.0002 0.0014 0.10 0.27 0.83 0.77 2.64 8.47
Russian Federation -5.96 0.035 0.68 -0.0002 0.0014 -0.14 -0.34 -0.71 1.03 3.08 8.93
Rwanda 19.93 0.016 0.35 0.0001 0.0011 0.06 0.15 0.42 0.80 2.49 7.12
St. Vincent & Grenadines 26.69 0.012 0.29 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.19 -0.26 0.70 0.13 0.38 1.16
Samoa 26.24 -0.004 0.28 0.0008 0.0014 0.02 0.66 3.64 0.31 2.31 8.31
Sao Tome and Principe 25.69 0.024 0.29 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.04 -0.11 -0.27 0.69 1.88 4.97
Saudi Arabia 25.51 0.021 0.55 -0.0007 0.0006 -0.26 -0.38 0.78 0.34 1.05 3.35
Senegal 28.29 0.026 0.35 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.31 -0.67 -0.73 0.53 1.46 4.01
Serbia 9.96 0.016 0.54 0.0002 0.0014 0.09 0.25 0.78 0.79 2.74 8.66
Sierra Leone 26.20 0.016 0.24 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.25 -0.47 -0.03 0.41 1.16 3.22
Slovakia 7.64 0.020 0.61 0.0001 0.0013 0.06 0.17 0.50 0.71 2.36 7.54
Slovenia 7.80 0.030 0.59 0.0003 0.0015 0.22 0.61 1.76 1.10 3.33 9.50
Solomon Islands 26.85 0.010 0.18 0.0002 0.0009 0.12 0.35 1.04 0.77 2.23 5.98
Somalia 26.65 0.021 0.32 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.37 -0.65 0.41 0.22 0.59 1.66
South Africa 17.52 0.007 0.33 0.0001 0.0012 0.04 0.11 0.35 0.67 2.46 7.56
South Korea 11.07 0.008 0.49 0.0008 0.0019 0.30 1.15 4.34 0.96 3.73 11.68
South Sudan 27.35 0.031 0.43 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.52 -0.98 0.05 0.32 0.87 2.40
Spain 13.31 0.026 0.45 -0.0001 0.0010 -0.08 -0.19 -0.43 0.77 2.26 6.39
Sri Lanka 27.11 0.011 0.21 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.07 -0.17 -0.27 0.50 1.51 4.23
Sudan 27.34 0.029 0.38 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.63 -1.04 1.21 0.19 0.51 1.38
Suriname 26.21 0.004 0.34 0.0003 0.0012 0.07 0.26 1.06 0.54 2.26 7.42
Swaziland 20.33 0.017 0.43 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.29 -0.23 2.14 0.09 0.24 0.71
Sweden 2.27 0.021 0.89 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.14 -0.24 0.07 0.24 0.76 2.67
Switzerland 4.88 0.018 0.49 0.0008 0.0019 0.46 1.45 4.60 1.32 4.27 12.24
Syria 17.88 0.022 0.65 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.19 -0.37 -0.07 0.37 1.12 3.67
Tajikistan 3.08 0.000 0.57 0.0003 0.0017 0.01 0.06 0.38 0.43 2.38 9.35
Tanzania 22.65 0.010 0.31 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.09 -0.17 0.02 0.46 1.54 4.73
Thailand 26.22 0.005 0.31 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.29 1.12 3.98
Togo 26.41 0.018 0.25 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.07 -0.18 -0.41 0.76 2.13 5.64
Trinidad and Tobago 25.62 0.024 0.30 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.36 -0.76 -0.56 0.24 0.64 1.74
Tunisia 20.08 0.037 0.43 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.82 -1.40 1.21 0.08 0.21 0.53
Turkey 11.24 0.014 0.70 0.0002 0.0014 0.07 0.20 0.64 0.60 2.26 7.98
Turkmenistan 15.67 0.025 0.67 0.0000 0.0012 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.72 2.30 7.19
Uganda 22.84 0.020 0.31 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.28 -0.56 -0.17 0.42 1.19 3.32
Ukraine 8.17 0.026 0.81 0.0002 0.0014 0.08 0.22 0.63 0.73 2.39 7.82
United Arab Emirates 27.22 0.016 0.48 0.0002 0.0015 0.08 0.22 0.65 0.92 3.10 9.31
United Kingdom 8.69 0.013 0.46 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 0.34 1.16 3.97
United States 6.94 0.015 0.36 0.0004 0.0016 0.20 0.60 1.88 1.20 3.77 10.52
Uruguay 17.49 0.015 0.35 0.0002 0.0009 0.09 0.24 0.70 0.65 2.05 6.00
US Virgin Islands 26.79 0.023 0.45 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.41 -0.50 1.89 -0.13 -0.30 -0.54
Uzbekistan 12.84 0.021 0.69 0.0007 0.0019 0.30 0.93 3.11 1.11 3.79 11.72
Vanuatu 24.75 0.028 0.33 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.38 -0.83 -0.87 0.21 0.55 1.48
Venezuela 25.00 0.016 0.30 0.0000 0.0010 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.82 2.45 6.74
Vietnam 23.20 0.005 0.32 0.0000 0.0009 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.38 1.51 5.15
Yemen 24.56 0.035 0.60 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.40 -0.82 -0.61 0.27 0.74 2.12
Zambia 21.17 0.019 0.47 0.0003 0.0015 0.18 0.51 1.56 1.06 3.40 9.82
Zimbabwe 21.24 0.014 0.47 0.0001 0.0013 0.04 0.12 0.35 0.76 2.62 8.15
Notes: We consider persistent increases in temperatures based on the RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenarios. The losses are based on
ih (di), see equation (31), with h = 16, 36, and 86 (corresponding to the year 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively) and m = 30.
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Table B.1: Division (SIC) and Sector (NAICS) Classications
Division (SIC) Sector (NAICS)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting
Mining Mining
Construction Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Transportation & Warehousing
Transport, Communication, and Public Utilities Information
Utilities
Wholesale Trade Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate Finance/Insurance/Real Estate/Rental/Leasing
Professional & Business Services
Services Educational Services/Health Care/Social Assistance
Arts/Entertainment/Recreation/Accommodation/Food Services
Other Services, Ex Government
Government Government
B U.S. Data Appendix
We obtain state-level economic activity data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Real
Gross State Product (GSP) data is available from 1977, but nominal GSP data is available from
1963. We deate the nominal GSP series using the consumer price index (CPI) for each state, and
splice the resulting data over 19631977 with the real GSP from 1977 using annual growth rates,
to construct a real GSP series for 19632016.
BEA provides output by sector at the state level from 1963. However, there are two issues with
this database. Firstly, there was a change in industrial classications in 1997: from 1963 to 1997,
the Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) consists of ten divisions, while from 1997 onwards,
the North American Industry Classication System (NAICS) gradually replaces the SIC, further
branching the ten divisions into fteen sectors.19 Secondly, as with the GSP data, only nominal
sectoral output data (by SIC divisions) is available before 1977. Real sectoral output is available
in both SIC and NAICS classication in 1997. This allows us to construct the real sectoral output
series from 19632016. Specically, building a series over the period 1963 to 2016 involves two steps:
(i) reconciling SIC and NAICS classications (see Table B.1), and (ii) splicing the most recent real
series (19972016) backwards using growth rates from the deated nominal series (19631997).
We use BEAs producer price index (PPI) data to deate the nominal industry outputs under
SIC for the years 19631976. As the PPI data is constructed based on NAICS, we use the SIC-
NAICS matching in Table B.1 for the PPI deator. Where there is more than one NAICS sector
matched to a SIC division, we take a simple arithmetic average of the PPI of all matched NAICS
sectors. From 1997 onwards, real output by sector is available based on NAICS classication.
We, therefore, aggregate the NAICS real output by industry to SIC divisions using our matching
scheme, and splice these series backwards using the growth rates of real sectoral output under SIC
19See Kort (2001) for more details.
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in 19631997. This gives us real output by sector and state for the period 1963 to 2016.20
We collect monthly state-level, area-weighted climate data from the NOAAs National Centres
for Environmental Information (NCEI). The NCEI reports monthly average temperature and pre-
cipitation21 for each state from aggregates of climate readings across weather stations, adjusting
for the distribution of stations and terrain. Temperature is measured in degrees Fahrenheit and
precipitation in inches. We convert them into degrees Celsius and millimeters, respectively (to
match our cross-country data). The monthly averages in each year within the sample period are
then used to obtain annual averages.
Finally, we obtain U.S. employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We take
annual, state-level number of employed persons that encompasses "persons 16 years and over in
the civilian noninstitutional population" under a wide range of employment conditions.
20Note that "Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting" and "Mining" data is not available for Rhode
Island in 2016 and agricultural data in 2016 is also unavailable for Delaware. Moreover, the mining industry
of Delaware is excluded from our sample due to multiple irregular missing entries.
21Snow is included as melted precipitation in rain gauges under NOAA methodology.
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